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Among the pieties of our legal system is the notion that 
appellate courts do not engage in factual evaluation.  Murky though 
the distinction between “fact” and “law” may be,1 there is general 
agreement that somewhere along the fact-law spectrum lies a point 
beyond which appellate courts ought not venture.2  Past it exist 
 
 1. See 2 STEVEN A. CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 7-26 
(2d ed. 1992) (noting that “[t]he law-fact distinction, joined by the pesky but realistic hybrid 
mixed question, is a difficult concept but often is seen as decisive on appeal”); HENRY M. HART, 
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION 
OF LAW 349-62 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (observing that “[s]ome 
critics have concluded that ‘law’ cannot be distinguished analytically from ‘fact’ ”). See generally 
Ronald J. Allen  & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1769 (2003) (arguing that “law” and “fact” are not distinct categories). 
 2. See, e.g., FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 668-69 (4th ed. 1992) (“Even 
more fundamental is the principle that an appellate court reviews questions of law and may not 
substitute its own view of the facts or make new fact findings.”); see also Samuel H. Hofstadter, 
Appellate Theory and Practice, 15 N.Y. CO. B. BULL. 34, 34 (1957) (“The principle that the trier of 
the facts, whether judge or jury, is in a far better position to determine where the truth lies than 
an appellate court with only the cold trial record before it has been stated and restated so often 
that it has become a truism.”); Charles E. Clark & Ferdinand F. Stone, Review of Findings of 
Fact, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 208 (1937) (noting that “[t]his is a canon of decision so well accepted 
that it is scarcely necessary to cite specific instances”).  The extent to which this general rule 
actually is applicable generally may be debated.  One can trace complaints about appellate 
courts meddling into factual determinations back at least seventy years.  See Charles A. Wright, 
The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 751, 778 (1957) (noting a 
trend, identified at least twenty-five years earlier, of appellate courts transforming what had 
previously been regarded as questions of fact into questions of law).  Even so, deference to the 
factual findings of the lower court is, at the very least, the default position.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. 
P. 52(a) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses.”). 
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questions of “historical fact,”3 the “who, when, what, and where”4 
series of questions that we have deemed only juries or trial judges to 
be capable of answering. 
Just as well accepted is the reasoning behind this juridical line 
in the sand.  Simply put, we believe that appellate courts are not very 
good at fact finding.  As it is most often articulated, this justification 
consists largely of reasoning thought to flow from the reality that 
appellate judges are not present in the courtroom to witness testimony 
and evidence firsthand.5  Having instead only a transcript of the 
proceedings below, the reviewing court lacks information critical to a 
full understanding of what took place.  Under the conventional 
wisdom, then, appellate courts would likely do a worse job of factual 
evaluation, making the endeavor pointless even without regard to the 
consumption of judicial resources and other systemic effects it would 
entail. 
This Article contends that the conventional wisdom is 
misguided.  There are, it turns out, many respects in which appellate 
courts enjoy substantial advantages over trial judges and juries when 
it comes to the evaluation of historical facts.  This alone would compel 
reevaluation of the relationship between trial and appellate courts.  
But there is more.  Considerations of institutional design and purpose 
lead to the conclusion that if the courts are to exercise these 
advantages, they ought to do so much more often in the criminal 
system, in which ensuring the factual guilt of the convicted is of 
paramount importance, than in the civil system, in which the 
avoidance of factual error is not of overriding importance.  Yet the 
reality is exactly backwards.  Despite governing standards that 
appear to preclude evaluation of historical facts in any context, 
mounting empirical evidence6 suggests that appellate courts routinely 
reexamine the evidence supporting a trial verdict in civil cases, but 
almost never do so in criminal cases. 
There are many potential explanations for this disparity.  At 
one extreme, it may be that the articulated characterizations of the 
criminal and civil systems do not accurately describe their respective 
aims—certainly a significant point if true, but one I do not consider in 
great detail. Less dramatically, but still significantly, it may be that 
the standards governing appellate review in fact provide very little 
governance at all.  After briefly taking up the latter possibility, this 
 
 3. See George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 14, 38-39 
(1992) (noting, but not adopting, the “historical fact” label). 
 4. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 235 (1985). 
       5.      See infra Part I.A. 
     6.      See infra Part II.B.2. 
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Article concludes that a more appropriate mechanism for appellate 
review would require express consideration of a court’s institutional 
competence to evaluate any historical facts under consideration.  
Review structured in this manner would not only provide a stronger 
linkage between systemic goals and their implementation in a given 
case, but would also serve to make appellate review itself more 
systematized and transparent; both of these attributes prove valuable 
in a broader jurisprudential sense. 
Part I begins the inquiry by contemplating and rejecting the 
conventional account of the relative institutional competencies of 
appellate courts and trial-level actors when it comes to the assessment 
of historical facts.  The discussion begins with a consideration of the 
nature of the raw materials based on which these assessments are 
conducted.  Rather than operating as a handicap, having recourse only 
to a transcript provides the reviewing court with certain advantages.  
Thought processes based on information from a textual source are 
more compatible with systematic, rational (and therefore “legal”) 
thought than are those based on information received orally.7  
Working with words fixed on a page rather than evanescent oral 
utterances, appellate courts are better able to perform the complex 
intellectual operations necessary to the proper evaluation of certain 
types of evidence. Moreover, research demonstrates that people 
consistently perform poorly at using demeanor evidence to assess 
credibility and veracity, such that much of the information 
traditionally thought to provide the jury with a fact-finding advantage 
may actually operate to mislead.8  In addition, appellate courts are at 
least as well equipped as trial-level fact finders to assess documentary 
and circumstantial evidence,9 and also enjoy advantages arising from 
experience and perspective.10  In sum, there are fundamental respects 
in which appellate courts can function as superior fact finders. 
The fact that appellate courts possess these capabilities does 
not, of course, mean that they ought to exercise them.  Part II takes 
up that determination, which depends on an analysis of the larger 
aims of the systems in which appellate courts, trial judges, and juries 
operate, coupled with a consideration of the standards currently 
governing appellate review and the manner in which courts apply 
those standards.  That exercise is revealing. 
 
 7. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 8. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 9. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 10. See infra Part I.B.3. 
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Despite the frequency and apparent intensity with which 
conclusions about the relative institutional competencies of appellate 
courts are repeated, examination of the courts in operation suggests 
that, at some perhaps not fully conscious level, judges recognize that 
they are not so limited in their ability to assess facts as the traditional 
justification holds.  A growing body of empirical research reveals that 
appellate courts are quite willing to engage in factual reexamination 
in civil cases, and accordingly uphold challenges to the sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting a verdict in a substantial portion of cases.11  
Some scholars have attributed this willingness to an attitude among 
appellate judges that plaintiffs are treated too hospitably in trial 
courts.12 
On the criminal side, in contrast, the conventional wisdom 
continues to hold sway.13  Despite mounting evidence that our 
criminal justice system has done a much worse job of sorting the 
guilty from the innocent than previously imagined, informed observers 
agree that challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence almost never 
succeed in criminal appeals.14  Although the empirical evidence is less 
well developed in this context, it is nonetheless consistent with that 
understanding. 
This is, or at least ought to be, an astonishing revelation.  
Standard accounts of the respective functions of the two systems 
suggest that if there is a disparity between them in the amount of 
deference appellate courts give to trial-level fact finding, it should be 
criminal cases in which courts engage in greater scrutiny.  In criminal 
cases, after all, our common understanding is that we must ensure 
that those who are convicted are in fact guilty.  Because of the stigma 
associated with being a convicted felon,15 together with the loss of 
 
 11. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 12. See infra text accompanying note 275. 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 184-189. 
 14. See infra notes 188-190 and accompanying text. 
 15. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952) (observing that the label 
“felon” is “as bad a word as you can give to a man or thing” (citing 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 465 (2d ed. 1899))); United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1125 n.2 
(6th Cir. 1985) (making an observation similar to the court in Morissette); see also Susan R. 
Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 680 (1999) (“Because 
both the stigma from being labeled a ‘felon’ and the harm suffered by the defendant from the 
punitive sanction is so great, the federal Constitution grants a criminal defendant a vast array of 
procedural protections not afforded a defendant in a civil action.”).  This stigma stems from the 
notion that a criminal conviction reflects moral blameworthiness.  PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL 
LAW 5 (1997). 
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liberty that typically results from a felony conviction,16 we believe that 
it is better that ten guilty men go free than that a single innocent be 
convicted.17  And while the criminal justice system serves multiple 
ends, “[w]here a conflict exists between protecting the innocent and 
other cornerstone objectives, it is the protection of the innocent that 
almost always prevails.”18  The civil system, in contrast, is more 
squarely focused on the simple resolution of disputes,19 with fewer 
moral overtones and less emphasis on the avoidance of error.20  What 
is more, the Seventh Amendment expressly constrains judicial 
reexamination of jury fact finding in civil cases, based in large part on 
concerns about governmental overreaching that are not implicated in 
the criminal setting.21 These considerations suggest that any 
departures from extreme appellate deference should occur in criminal, 
rather than civil, cases. 
 
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (noting the 
substantial difference between the loss of money and property and the loss of liberty and 
stigmatization of a felony conviction). 
 17. While ten appears to be the number most frequently used, the number varies depending 
on the source.  See Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt,” 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 980-81 
(1993) (citing authorities advocating numbers ranging from ten to ninety-nine).  See generally 
Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997). Consistent with these notions, 
the structure of our trial mechanism provides numerous protections against wrongful 
convictions. Foremost among these is the requirement that every element of a crime be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, which the Supreme Court first held as constitutionally compelled in 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).  In addition, most jurisdictions require that a jury’s 
verdict be unanimous.  Federal criminal trials require unanimous verdicts.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 
31(a).  Although the Supreme Court has noted that unanimous verdicts are not constitutionally 
compelled, most states require them. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412 (1972); Johnson 
v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 (1972); Michael H. Glasser, Comment, Letting the Supermajority 
Rule: Nonunanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 671 (1997) 
(noting that only two states allow for non-unanimous verdicts in criminal cases).  These core 
protections are buttressed by a host of ancillary safeguards, such as prohibitions on improper 
argument, requirements that certain types of unduly prejudicial evidence generally be excluded, 
and similar protections. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (formulating 
the standard that while a prosecutor “may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul 
ones.  It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”); FED. R. EVID. 404(b) 
(“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show action in conformity therewith.”). Prior to trial, the less formalized mechanisms of 
police and prosecutorial discretion also operate to reduce the number of innocent or not-guilty 
people subjected to the possibility of wrongful conviction. 
 18. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 192 (2d ed. 1999). 
 19. E.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.1 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that the 
purpose of most rules of civil procedure “is to promote the just, efficient, and economical 
resolution of civil disputes”); FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.1 (4th ed. 1992) 
(observing that procedural law “is a model . . . of dispute resolution”). 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 123-130. 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 288-293. 
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Doctrinally, this systemic differential receives only minimal 
recognition. In general and in both systems, the standards governing 
both the scope and manner22 of appellate review of facts reflect the 
traditional understanding of relative institutional competencies and 
thus call for considerable deference.  For example, in the context of 
claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the 
verdict,23 the governing standards in both criminal and civil cases pose 
roughly the same question for the reviewing court.  The court must 
first view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and 
then ask whether the verdict could have been reached by a reasonable 
jury.  This is, at least nominally, a question of law or so-called 
“ultimate fact,” but it also provides the principal means through which 
appellate courts supervise the finding of historical facts.24  Assessment 
of credibility and the weighing of evidence are deemed to be off-limits.  
The only meaningful difference between the two sets of standards 
relates to the incorporation of the underlying burden of proof.25  In 
criminal cases, of course, a jury can only convict based on proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, whereas in civil cases, all that is typically 
required for the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff is proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  In each instance, the appellate court is 
to incorporate this standard into determining whether a reasonable 
jury could have reached its verdict on the evidence presented.  At least 
at the margins, then, appellate courts should be more likely to find the 
evidence insufficient in criminal than in civil cases. 
 
 22. This Article tends to use the phrase “standard of review” somewhat loosely to refer to 
both of these notions, thereby including ideas that some might prefer to see expressed in terms of 
“scope of review.”  See, e.g., J. Dickson Phillips, Jr., The Appellate Review Function: Scope of 
Review, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1984, at 1, 1 (distinguishing between standards of 
review and scope of review and lamenting the lack of “a fairly well-developed and readily 
accessible jurisprudence” concerning either); see also Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative 
Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of 
Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 993-98 (1986) 
(focusing on scope of review in summarizing the distinction between trial and appellate 
functions); id. at 997 (“Scope of review . . . is the principal means by which adjudicative 
decisional power and responsibility are divided between the trial and appellate levels.”). 
 23. I generally refer to such claims as “sufficiency claims,” and in so doing, mean to refer to 
the entire class of claims in which a defendant asserts that the trial-level fact finder did not have 
an appropriate evidentiary basis for its verdict.  Cf. Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why 
Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 474 (1996) (“A 
conviction can be ‘wrong’ in many ways.  It might be excessive—for example, if the defendant is 
really guilty of second-degree murder but was convicted of first-degree murder; or the jury might 
have been right to conclude that the defendant committed the fatal act, but wrong to reject a 
defense of insanity or self-defense; or a conviction that is factually accurate might have been 
obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights.”). 
 24. Louis, supra note 22, at 1019. 
 25. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1. 
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 There are many possible interpretations of this seeming 
disconnect between the implications of institutional design and 
function, on the one hand, and the actual practice of appellate review, 
on the other.26  This Article focuses on the possibility that the 
standards governing appellate review of facts do not provide 
meaningful guidance or appropriate constraints.  By fixing the level of 
appellate deference based on the type of claim rather than on the type 
of evidence under consideration, the standards fail to appropriately 
calibrate the relationship between the questions the courts are 
required to ask and those they are competent to answer.  By 
incorporating the concept of reasonableness, they allow enough 
analytical wiggle room for either no review or nearly full review. 
This allows not only for a reality in which the conduct of 
appellate review is in tension with the purported functions of the 
systems in which it takes place, but also a state of affairs that is 
troubling on a higher level.  The idea that like cases be treated alike, 
which is fundamental to the American legal system, requires that law 
be updated to account for expansions in our understanding of which 
cases are in fact alike.  Accordingly, this Article’s prescriptive point is 
that appellate review of facts should be reordered so as to require 
express consideration of institutional competence as applied to the 
specific matters before the court in a given case. At the same time, 
appellate review should account for these disparate systemic aims in 
answering the distinct question of the extent to which courts ought to 
utilize their competence advantages in various types of cases.  
Appropriately done, this would serve not only to correct the imbalance 
between review in the criminal and civil systems, but also to make the 
process of appellate factual review more systematized in a general 
sense. 
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE JUSTIFICATION FOR APPELLATE 
DEFERENCE TO TRIAL-LEVEL FACT FINDING  
A.  Review of Facts and the Centrality of Perceived Institutional 
Competence 
Notions of relative institutional competence form the grounds 
on which justifications of appellate deference to trial-level fact finding 
 
 26.   I briefly discuss one account of the ostensible difference between what we say the 
criminal justice system is designed to accomplish and what we may actually mean for it to 
accomplish below.  See infra Part II.C.    
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are almost universally formulated.27  There are, to be sure, many 
additional considerations governing the allocation of responsibilities 
between the trial and appellate levels, including judicial economy, the 
enhancement of public regard for the functioning of the judicial 
system, and the need for both consistent decisions and clear rules.  
These considerations certainly play some role in the allocation of 
primary fact-finding responsibility to trial judges and juries, and they 
are addressed below.28  It is clear, however, that institutional 
competence is the dominant consideration. 
The perceived advantage of the trial-level fact finder has two 
dimensions.  The first is situational.  Whether judge or jury, the finder 
of fact at the trial level is present in court as the evidence comes in.  
The fact finder thus enjoys an advantage over appellate courts in that 
it experiences the introduction of evidence and testimony as it 
happens.29  Because of this, the fact finder can assess not only what a 
witness says, but also how she says it.  Her tone of voice may signal 
sarcasm, confusion, or hostility.  She may appear truthful, or not.  She 
may confidently handle cross-examination on proposed inconsistencies 
in her story, or she may appear flustered, hesitant, and untruthful.  
She may even illustrate her testimony with an exhibit or by way of a 
temporary diagram not admitted into evidence and thus not a part of 
the appellate record. 
This reasoning reflects an intuitive recognition of the nature of 
oral communication, in which words do not carry the entire burden of 
transmitting information.  Used orally, words alone are a relatively 
inefficient vehicle for communication because the limitations of 
human oral memory and processing capacity cap the amount of 
information we can keep in present memory, as well as the length of 
 
 27. See, e.g., 3 AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: STANDARDS 
RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.11, 24-28 (1994) (offering a competence-based account of the 
reasons for appellate deference); ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 28 
(1941) (“There is a loss of fine shades in even the stenographic transcript of testimony, and the 
effect of evidence may depend upon them.”); ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS 
ERROR 20 (1970) (“Many factors may affect the probative value of testimony, such as age, sex, 
intelligence, experience, occupation, demeanor, or temperament of the witness.  A trial court or 
jury before whom witnesses appear is at least in a position to take note of such factors.  An 
appellate court has no way of doing so.”); Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 
EMORY L.J. 747, 759 (1982) (“The most notable exception to full appellate review is deference to 
the trial court’s determination of the facts.  The trial court’s direct contact with the witnesses 
places it in a superior position to perform this task.”); Ellen E. Sward, Appellate Review of 
Judicial Fact-Finding, 40 KAN. L. REV. 1, 19 (1991) (“An assessment of the relative competence 
of courts to evaluate evidence is, thus, the primary force behind development of the clearly 
erroneous standard.”). 
 28. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 29. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 27, at 759. 
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time it remains there.30  As a consequence, much of the meaning 
conveyed by a verbal utterance lies outside the actual words that the 
speaker uses.31  Because speakers must, in effect, economize on words, 
the words themselves—if considered apart from the behavior of the 
speaker—may be ambiguous.  Put another way, it is often 
characteristic of verbal communication that the words themselves do 
not autonomously represent the speaker’s meaning.32  “Speakers in 
face-to-face situations circumvent this ambiguity by means of such 
prosodic and paralinguistic cues as gestures, intonation, stress, 
quizzical looks, and restatement.”33  Jurors and trial judges are 
presumed to be able to decipher these cues. 
The appellate court, in contrast, cannot access these additional 
cues to meaning, and must instead review what is typically 
characterized as the “cold” record.34  This consists primarily of a 
transcript of the proceedings before the trial court. Almost none of the 
behavioral nuances that are readily apparent to the fact finder come 
through in such a transcript.35  Court reporters do not denote witness 
 
 30. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
 31. See David R. Olson, From Utterance to Text: The Bias of Language in Speech and 
Writing, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 257, 263 (1977) (observing that certain oral statements “require 
context and prior knowledge and wisdom for their interpretation”); see also MARSHALL 
MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 79 (1964) (“Many a page of prose 
and many a narrative has been devoted to expressing what was, in effect, a sob, a moan, a laugh, 
or a piercing scream.  The written word spells out in sequence what is quick and implicit in the 
spoken word.”).  For a general discussion of how these ideas play out in various aspects of the 
legal system, see Paul Bergman, The War Between the States (of Mind): Oral Versus Textual 
Reasoning, 40 ARK. L. REV. 505 (1987). 
 32. Olson, supra note 31, at 277 (noting that “utterances appeal for their meaning to shared 
experiences and interpretations”); see also WALTER J. ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY: THE 
TECHNOLOGIZING OF THE WORD 101-02 (1982) (“In a text even the words that are there lack their 
full phonetic qualities.  In oral speech, a word must have one or another intonation or tone of 
voice—lively, excited, quiet, incensed, resigned, or whatever.  It is impossible to speak a word 
orally without any intonation.”); Walter J. Ong, The Writer’s Audience Is Always a Fiction, 
reprinted in CROSS-TALK IN COMP THEORY: A READER 55, 57 (Victor Villanueva, Jr. ed., 1997) 
(“[T]he spoken word is part of present actuality and has its meaning established by the total 
situation in which it comes into being.  Context for the spoken word is simply present, centered 
in the person speaking and the one or ones to whom he addresses himself and to whom he is 
related existentially in terms of the circumambient actuality.”). 
 33. Olson, supra note 31, at 272. 
 34. See, e.g., LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 85 (1939) (“The 
cold printed record inevitably must give an incomplete and sometimes distorted picture of the 
case.”); Robert C. Owen & Melissa Mather, Thawing Out the “Cold Record”: Some Thoughts on 
How Videotaped Records May Affect Traditional Standards of Deference on Direct and Collateral 
Review, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 411, 412 (2000) (noting that some appellate judges insist that 
“only the traditional ‘cold’ record permits reasoned decisionmaking”); see also KARL N. 
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 28 n.20 (1960) (referring to “the 
frozen record”). 
 35. It is impossible for any appellate judge or judges to read a bare transcript and 
secure from it all of the nuances bearing on the question of credibility—the lifted 
   
2004] APPELLATE COURTS, HISTORICAL FACTS 447 
demeanor, and while they may note when a witness points or 
gestures, they cannot reveal what she was pointing at or capture the 
information conveyed by the gesture.  Sometimes court reporters edit 
the record for ease of reading or fail to accurately transcribe the 
proceedings, thereby shifting the relative eloquence of various 
witnesses.36  Thus, the information available to the appellate court is a 
less textured, and perhaps even different, version of what was 
experienced by the fact finder.  Because of this, even those who have 
advocated for a significant appellate role in the review of facts have 
conceded that “[t]he cold printed record inevitably must give an 
incomplete and sometimes distorted picture of the case.”37  Because 
“there is a significant difference between being there and reading 
about it,”38 the reasoning goes, the appellate court is comparatively 
inept at assessing testimony and therefore ought not to do so at all. 
The second, and less frequently emphasized, dimension to the 
trial court’s supposed advantage has to do with experience.  
Interestingly, the content of this justification varies considerably 
depending on whether the fact finder is judge or jury.  With respect to 
judges, the contention is not merely that trial courts are better 
positioned to assess facts, but also that trial courts “develop an 
 
eyebrow; the ‘yes’ which means ‘no’ or ‘maybe,’ or vice versa; the delays or hesitations 
in answering questions; the soft-spoken word; the loud voice; the nervous voice; the 
quizzical glance.  
Judge John F. Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate Courts—Is 
the “Clearly Erroneous Rule” Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 409, 422 n.87 (1981) (citations 
omitted); see also POUND, supra note 27, at 28 (“There is a loss of fine shades in even the best 
stenographic transcript of testimony, and the effect of evidence may depend on them.”).  
Interestingly, this justification appears to predate the widespread generation of transcripts, and 
not to have changed in light of it.  See William W. Blume, Review of Facts in Non-Jury Cases, 20 
J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 68, 71 (1936).  Blume noted: 
In literally thousands of cases courts of the United States have iterated and re-
iterated the supposed truth that a trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses is in a 
better position to determine issues of fact than an appellate court which gets its 
impressions from a cold, printed record.  This supposed truth became accepted before 
the days of court stenographers and has persisted in spite of the fact that it is now 
possible to reproduce for the appellate court the exact words of the questions 
propounded, and the answers given, in the court below. 
Id. 
 36. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of 
Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1203-04 (1993) 
(“There is currently dispute as to the accuracy of the current transcription procedures.”). 
 37. ORFIELD, supra note 34, at 85; see also POUND, supra note 27, at 6 (“[W]here evidence is 
taken orally in open court, even if fully transcribed verbatim, much of what is important in 
arriving at a determination of the facts is lost to a reviewing court.  Hence it is universally 
agreed that the scope of review on the facts is necessarily limited . . . .”). 
 38. Cynthia K.Y. Lee, A New “Sliding Scale of Deference” Approach to Abuse of Discretion: 
Appellate Review of District Court Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 35 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 13 (1997). 
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expertise in fact finding that eludes the appellate courts, which deal 
primarily with issues of law.”39  In other words, not only do trial 
judges have the ability to view witness demeanor, but they also are 
better at disentangling conflicting evidence simply because they have 
more practice.  In the case of juries, the emphasis shifts to jurors’ 
utter lack of experience.  Since jurors are typically not repeat 
participants in the court system, the reasoning goes, they do not 
approach cases with the sorts of predispositions that judges, who may 
have seen the same type of case hundreds of times, are likely to 
develop.  Instead, jurors bring the beliefs and attitudes of the 
community, a willingness to treat each case as novel, and openness to 
both sides’ arguments.40 
These appear to be powerful justifications.  Just as a picture is 
worth a thousand words, so does being in the presence of the parties, 
witnesses, and counsel allow a juror to take in considerably more 
information than an appellate judge merely reading a transcript.  The 
two experiences are not the same, and anyone who has absorbed a 
trial solely through its transcript knows that it can be a frustrating 
and incomplete experience.  Perhaps because of the strong intuitive 
appeal of this reasoning, the notion that trial-level fact finders are 
always and for all purposes superior to appellate courts in dealing 
with historical facts has received very little judicial or scholarly 
consideration.41  Most of the few commentators to have spoken to the 
issue have done so in passing and have simply stated it as a more or 
less incontrovertible proposition. It is assumed that, to use a 
representative quote, “[t]he jury that heard the case, complete with 
 
 39. Thomas Cane & Kevin M. Long, Shifting the Main Event: The Documentary Evidence 
Exception Improperly Converts the Appellate Courts into Fact-Finding Tribunals, 77 MARQ. L. 
REV. 475, 485 (1994); see also Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (“The 
trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role 
comes expertise.”); Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that an 
appellate court’s deference to the trial court’s findings of fact is based upon “the belief that 
district courts have a good deal of ‘expertise’ when it comes to fact-finding”). 
 40. Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 873, 883-85 
(2002) (arguing that a jury’s “decisions are manifestly based on the attitudes of the citizens of the 
community rather than on those of a judicial elite”).  Taken together, these arguments suggest 
not only that primary fact-finding responsibility should lie in the trial-level fact finder, but also 
that, in jury cases, trial courts should have the primary responsibility by way of post-trial 
motions for determining whether the jury based its verdict on sufficient evidence, and that 
appellate courts should give almost complete deference to these rulings. 
 41. To a lesser degree the same is true of the topic of appellate review more broadly.  In 
1984, Judge Phillips lamented the general lack of a “well-developed and readily accessible 
jurisprudence” concerning the scope of appellate review and standards of review, both of which 
are implicated in this Article.  Phillips, supra note 22, at 1. 
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live testimony, was in a better position to assess the evidence than 
subsequent decisionmakers.”42 
B. Critique of the Institutional Competence Justification 
There is much to be said for the institutional competence 
justification for appellate deference.  Whatever imperfections may be 
attributed to trial judges or a group of twelve citizens off the street 
when it comes to evaluating behavior, assessing motives, and the 
like,43 such a group will often be in a better position to do so than a 
group of judges removed in time and space from the evidence and 
possessing only a transcript of the proceedings.  Moreover, even if one 
believes that juries sometimes or often perform these tasks badly, 
there is, with respect to many of the core functions of juries, no reason 
to believe that an appellate court could do better.  And, in some 
situations in which an appellate court could outperform the trial-level 
fact finder, we might still conclude that appellate intervention is 
inappropriate for reasons apart from a concern for factual accuracy.44 
To say, however, that juries and trial courts are superior fact-
finding instruments in most cases and with respect to most types of 
evidence is not to say that they are superior in all cases and with 
respect to all types of evidence.  Indeed, reflection on everyday 
experience suggests that the institutional competence justification is 
not as powerful as its near-universal acceptance would appear to 
indicate.  Despite the relative power of pictures and other visual 
sources of information, much of our communication takes place 
through the written word.  We watch the nightly news on television or 
listen to it on the radio, but we also read newspapers and 
newsmagazines.45  In our daily lives we constantly recognize that 
some sorts of information are better conveyed and absorbed visually or 
orally, while others come across better through text.  Perhaps more 
significantly for present purposes, we recognize that different aspects 
of the same information are better conveyed via different modes of 
communication.  Reading the text of a poem or play is a different, and 
 
 42. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default 
in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 727 (1990). 
 43. A large body of literature examines the capabilities of juries.  See generally, e.g., 
STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JURY (1994); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 
(1966); SAUL M. KASSIN & LAURENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1988). 
 44. See infra text accompanying notes 209-211. 
 45. Cf. David Brinkley, On Being an Anchorman, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2003, at A15 
(“Television news is not merely the same news delivered in a different way.  It is different 
because the means of its delivery changes its meaning to its audience . . . .”). 
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not necessarily inferior, experience as compared to hearing it read or 
seeing it performed. 
There is no reason to believe that a similar dynamic does not 
hold with respect to trials.  To be sure, just as plays are written to be 
best appreciated by an audience watching them be performed, jury 
trials are in an important sense theater.  Counsel for both sides 
recognize that it is the jury that will make the determination as to 
guilt or liability, and accordingly structure their presentations in a 
manner calculated to maximize the appeal of their case in the eyes of 
the jury.46  Though trials are in this sense productions designed for an 
audience of jurors,47 they are not (primarily) about the jury.  The jury’s 
deliberation and verdict perhaps constitute one of the ends of the 
process,48 but they function more prominently as the primary means 
to a different end.  That is to say, although the parties may direct 
their efforts toward the jury with the goal of obtaining a favorable 
verdict, the articulated49 aim of the process is to resolve a dispute 
between civil litigants or to determine whether, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, a criminal defendant committed the crimes with which he is 
charged.  To the extent that the jury (or trial judge) is comparatively 
less competent than an appellate court in performing the tasks 
necessary to satisfy these primary goals, the traditional, the 
competence-based justification fails to fully account for the 
universality of appellate deference to factual determinations that 
inheres in the stated standards of review. 
The same considerations that motivate us to gather 
information in different forms in our daily lives suggest that appellate 
courts may enjoy certain advantages when it comes to the assessment 
of some facts.  The remainder of this section explores those areas of 
potential superiority. 
 
 46. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. FONTHAM, TRIAL TECHNIQUE AND EVIDENCE § 1-5(d) (2d ed. 2002) 
(exhorting lawyers to “consider the listeners and their ability to absorb information, and tailor 
the presentation for easy understanding”); ASHLEY S. LIPSON, DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE: ART OF 
ADVOCACY §§ 10.07-10.09 (1995) (emphasizing repeatedly the need to use documentary evidence 
so as to maximize the appeal of one’s case to the jury); THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES § 
2.2 (6th ed. 2002) (discussing research concerning juror capabilities and its implications for trial 
strategy). 
 47. The comparison of trials to theater is not infrequently made.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW 126-30 (1995) (analogizing judging to being a spectator at a play or movie); 
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? A 
Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 17 (1990) (asserting that a trial’s “symbolic and educational 
effects are made so powerful only because the human drama of the trial is so engrossing and . . . 
entertaining”). 
 48. See infra text accompanying note 235-239. 
 49. As discussed below, some have speculated that the articulated ends may not be the 
same as the actual ends.  See infra Part II.A.3.c. 
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1. The Advantages of a Transcript 
The first sense in which a jury or trial judge is disadvantaged 
relative to an appellate court involves the form in which information is 
presented to the jury or trial judge.  Trials are largely oral and visual 
productions.  Although demonstrative and documentary evidence is 
often involved,50 the main feature of trials is witness testimony 
sandwiched between opening statements and closing arguments.  As 
noted above, the opportunity to observe all this firsthand is generally 
thought to place juries and trial judges at a tremendous comparative 
advantage.  At least some of the meaning of the testimony is conveyed 
via means apart from the words the witness uses, and only those 
present in the courtroom are in a position to extract that meaning.  
But there is a flipside.  While much information is amenable to being 
communicated effectively in this manner, some is not, or at least not 
to an equal extent.51  Perhaps more significantly, the largely oral 
nature of trials can lead juries to evaluate the evidence in a manner 
that is inconsistent with the rigorous, logical ideals of the legal 
system.52 
Consider the juror’s situation.  Much of the information 
conveyed at trial is present only for an instant, then disappears, 
almost always to be replaced by additional, new information that the 
juror must also process.53  “[S]ound has a special relationship to time 
unlike that of the other fields that register in human sensation.  
Sound exists only when it is going out of existence.  It is not simply 
perishable but essentially evanescent, and it is sensed as 
evanescent.”54  Thus, the juror has little opportunity to reflect on what 
she has heard.  She may fail to connect a piece of information with the 
rest of what she has heard, fail to understand it, forget it, or simply 
miss it altogether.  In the typical courtroom, jurors are expected to 
passively receive the information presented to them. This leads to 
 
 50. For the implications of documentary evidence on appellate review, see infra text 
accompanying notes 111-116. 
 51. For this reason, a common theme in works on trial advocacy is that lawyers should 
structure their presentations to the jury to avoid complexity.  See, e.g., FONTHAM, supra note 46, 
§ 1-5(d), at 8-9.  “People today are part of the television age or, more recently, computer age, and 
are used to receiving information visually.  Trials, however, largely involve witness testimony.  
Research has shown that after two or three days listeners retain only about 10 percent of aural 
messages . . . .”  MAUET, supra note 46, § 2.2, at 21. 
 52. See infra text accompanying notes 73-78. 
 53. “Under normal viewing conditions, visual information is erased from the sensory 
register in about a quarter of a second and is replaced by new information long before it has a 
chance to fade out by itself.”  CHARLES G. MORRIS, PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 222 (7th ed. 
1990).  Auditory information is retained longer, but still only for a matter of seconds.  Id. 
 54. ONG,  supra note 32, at 31-32. 
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their having only a limited appreciation of the larger context in which 
that information exists, and a perhaps more limited understanding of 
the ultimate issues they will be expected to resolve based on the 
information provided.55  Only infrequently are jurors allowed to ask 
questions, take notes, or, in some courtrooms, have testimony read 
back to them.56  Thus, detailed or complicated information may be 
difficult to convey to a jury.57  And although this difficulty can be 
addressed through the use of demonstrative evidence, there always 
remains the possibility that jurors will fail to appreciate critical 
factual nuances due simply to the manner in which evidence is 
presented at trial. 
Not only does the reliance on oral testimony create difficulties 
with respect to information retention, it also affects the manner in 
which jurors think about the evidence.58  Language functions not only 
to facilitate communication among human beings, but also as an 
important mechanism for the manipulation of cognition.59  As a 
consequence, changes in the medium of communication can affect the 
 
 55. “Too often, jurors are allowed to do nothing but listen passively to the testimony, 
without any idea what the legal issues are in the case, without permission to take notes or 
participate in any way, finally to be read a virtually incomprehensible set of instructions and 
sent into the jury room to reach a verdict in a case they may not understand much better than 
they did before the trial began.”  Sandra Day O’Connor, Juries: They May Be Broken, But We Can 
Fix Them, FED. LAW., June 1997, at 20, 22.  Jury research confirms that jurors are often 
uncertain as to their role.  See ANDREAS KAPARDIS, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 141-43 (1997) 
(discussing the ability of jurors to “understand and return all important information”); 
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 325-29 (1994) 
(discussing the ability of jurors to “understand and retain all important information”); Edith 
Greene, On Juries and Damage Awards: The Process of Decisionmaking, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 225, 229-31 (discussing research based on juror interviews); see also 
Ronald S. Longhofer, Jury Trial Techniques in Complex Civil Litigation, 32 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 335 (1999) (cataloging the difficulties facing jurors in complex litigation, and suggesting 
solutions); William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575, 586-88 (1991) 
(discussing ways in which the legal system operates to keep information from jurors). 
 56. See Marietta S. Robinson, Should Jurors Be Allowed to Ask Questions of Witnesses? 
Yes!, FED. LAW., May 1998, at 48, 48-50 (discussing jurors’ general inability to ask questions); 
Schwarzer, supra note 55, at 590-94 (discussing juror note-taking, questions by jurors, and some 
judges’ refusal to have testimony read back to the jury).  In most jurisdictions, the decision 
whether to allow testimony to be read back rests in the discretion of the trial judge.  See 
generally L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Right to Have Reporters Notes Read to Jury, 50 A.L.R.2d 176 
(1956). 
 57. See Bergman, supra note 31, at 520 (“[O]ral language is concrete and imagistic, 
unsuitable to the expression of abstract concepts or logical propositions.”); Olson, supra note 31, 
at 278 (noting that oral language “is an instrument of limited power for exploring abstract 
ideas”). 
 58. Larry C. Farmer et al., The Effect of the Method of Presenting Trial Testimony on Juror 
Decisional Processes, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 59, 66-71 (Bruce D. Sales ed., 1977) 
(concluding that methods of presentation affect the manner in which jurors evaluate testimony). 
 59. JACK GOODY, THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE WRITTEN AND THE ORAL 259-60 (1987) 
(discussing the work of Russian psychologist Vygotsky). 
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cognitive processes of those on the receiving end.60  As Marshall 
McLuhan famously put it, “the medium is the message.”61 Thus, there 
are fundamental differences in the ways in which people use orally, as 
opposed to textually, conveyed information.62  In addition to being 
relatively ineffective as a means of communicating abstract or complex 
material, oral language encourages an intuitive and emotional 
thought process in its hearers.63  The medium itself strongly tends 
toward concrete and imagistic, as opposed to abstract and logical, 
 
 60. Id. at 260, 262-64. 
 61. See, e.g., MCLUHAN, supra note 31, at 7.  Elsewhere McLuhan made the point more 
poetically: 
Until WRITING was invented, we lived in acoustic space, where all backward peoples 
still live: boundless, directionless, horizonless, the dark of the mind, the world of 
emotion, primordial intuition, mafia-ridden.  Speech is a social chart of this dark bog. 
SPEECH structures the abyss of mental and acoustic space, shrouding the race; it is a 
cosmic, invisible architecture of the human dark. 
In the computer age, speech yields to macrocosmic gesticulation or the direct interface 
of total cultures.  The silent movies began this move. 
WRITING turned a spotlight on the high, dim Sierras of speech; writing was the 
visualization of acoustic space.  It lit up the dark. 
A goose quill put an end to talk, abolished mystery, gave us enclosed space and towns, 
brought roads and armies and bureaucracies.  It was the basic metaphor with which 
the cycle of CIVILIZATION began, the step from the dark into the light of the mind.  
The hand that filled a paper built a city. 
MARSHALL MCLUHAN, COUNTERBLAST 13-14 (1969).  For a recent article drawing on McLuhan’s 
work in the First Amendment context, see generally Heidi Kitrosser, From Marshall McLuhan to 
Anthropomorphic Cows: Communicative Manner and the First Amendment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 
1339 (2002). 
 62. These differences have effects on both the individual and social levels.  “After its 
movement from script to print, the law tended toward the depersonalized, the objectified and 
systematic, the controllable and inflexible, and the abstract.”  Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. 
Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 516 (1992).  Collins and Skover traced the evolution of 
law from orality to print, concluding that the supremacy of print “means that the printed text 
typically will overpower and subdue context.  The typographic word enhances all of the values 
associated with the supremacy of law—uniformity, predictability, universality, and analytical 
applicability of printed commands.  With its systematic categories and abstract concepts, 
typographic law emphasizes detached and logical analysis.”  Id. at 534 (citation omitted).  They 
predict that the increasing use of electronic “paratexts” will lead to a fundamental change in the 
nature of the legal regime.  Id. See generally Richard J. Ross, Communications Revolutions and 
Legal Culture: An Elusive Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 637 (2002) (evaluating the work 
of Collins & Skover and others).  For other explorations of the significance of the media through 
which law is communicated, see generally Susan L. DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, 
and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 489 (2002); Bernard J. Hibbitts, “Coming to 
Our Senses”: Communication and Legal Expression in Performance Cultures, 41 EMORY L.J. 873 
(1992); Glen Stohr, Comment, The Repercussions of Orality in Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 679 (1999). 
 63. See Bergman, supra note 31, at 511-18 (discussing the theory suggesting this hypothesis 
and research examining it).  Bergman traces the thinking on this subject back to Plato, who was 
highly skeptical of oral learning.  Id. at 513. 
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expression.64  In addition, limitations on human ability to hold orally 
communicated information in memory impair the ability to process the 
information in an intellectually complex fashion.65  These observations 
led Paul Bergman to conclude that the mechanism of the jury trial 
“tolerates and even encourages decisions made not through the 
application of logic but through the use of common folk wisdom.”66 
Consider now the situation of the appellate court.  It must rely 
on text—specifically, a transcript of the proceedings below—to 
reconstruct what happened.67  This is a radically different mechanism 
for delivery of information, and it has certain advantages over oral 
testimony.68  Although the information conveyed by a transcript is 
perhaps less textured than that conveyed by the testimony it reflects, 
this might itself provide an advantage.  As discussed in the next 
subsection,69 some of the additional texture to which the fact finder is 
exposed, such as witness demeanor, might actually operate to mislead, 
and thereby to impede the fact-finding process.  Thus, the appellate 
court’s ability to consider the testimony divorced from its nonverbal 
components may itself provide a competence advantage.  In short, less 
information can result in more accurate fact finding. 
A more obvious advantage of a transcript is that it represents a 
less ephemeral mode of communication.  A jury or trial judge is 
 
 64. Id. at 520. 
 65. Id. at 524. 
 66. Id. at 509.  See generally Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the 
Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REV. 273 (1989) (investigating juror fact finding through the lens of 
cognitive theory, and in so doing, touching on the effect of the oral nature of trials). 
 67. Typically, a transcript is not prepared until after the appeal process has commenced, 
and consequently a trial court would not have access to one.  See FED. R. APP. P. 10, 11 (outlining 
requirements for preparation of the record on appeal and the transcript).  As a result, the trial 
judge’s experience of the trial, like the jury’s, consists primarily of oral testimony.  This reality 
suggests that trial judges’ evaluation of the evidence is subject to the same limitations as the 
jury’s evaluation, and thus amenable to the same correctives.  Cf. Bergman, supra note 31, at 
531 (“If the theory that oral discourse produces a different reasoning process than written text is 
correct, we would expect that trial judges and jurors should, as a general rule, arrive at similar 
results.”). 
 68. This assumption does not suggest that text is universally the best means of 
communicating information.  For example, research suggests that a combination of audio and 
visual means is generally superior to text alone or auditory information alone.  See, e.g., Richard 
E. Mayer & Roxana Moreno, A Split-Attention Effect in Multimedia Learning: Evidence for Dual 
Processing Systems in Working Memory, 90 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 312 (1998); Roxana Moreno & 
Richard E. Mayer, Cognitive Principles of Multimedia Learning: The Role of Modality and 
Contiguity, 91 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 358 (1999); Roxana Moreno & Richard E. Mayer, Verbal 
Redundancy in Multimedia Learning: When Reading Helps Listening, 94 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 156 
(2002).  Except to the extent that demonstrative exhibits are used (in which case the jury has the 
benefit of such a combination), neither trial-level fact finders (who will be restricted to a mostly 
oral presentation) nor appellate courts (who will be restricted to a mostly textual format) has the 
advantage of such a combination. 
 69. See infra Part I.B.2. 
   
2004] APPELLATE COURTS, HISTORICAL FACTS 455 
disadvantaged in that it has only a single opportunity to view a trial.  
Jurors may simply forget information provided early in the trial.  
Things that appear utterly insignificant at the outset—and thus are 
likely disregarded—may later turn out to be significant.  Another 
problem is that juries may be required to keep many versions of the 
same story straight in their heads.  Crime victims may be interviewed 
several times, by several different police officers, with a slightly 
different version of events emerging each time.  Each eyewitness is 
likely to report having seen something different from the others.  The 
defendant may have said one thing at one time and another thing at a 
different time.  It is difficult enough to keep the details of a single 
statement present in one’s mind over the course of a trial, let alone 
those of a series of related statements. 
For an appellate judge viewing a transcript, the words on the 
page do not appear for only an instant, but instead remain to be 
reread and reconsidered.70  This ability to “backloop” allows the reader 
to devote less effort to keeping information in memory and thus to 
allocate more cognitive resources to understanding the material.71  
The limitations of oral memory no longer constrain the intellectual 
operations that may be performed with the information conveyed.  
Information can now be placed side by side.  Witness A’s testimony 
can be contrasted directly with Witness B’s.  Factual and logical gaps 
that were not apparent in the constant flow of testimony can be 
uncovered and explored. 
Purely in terms of attaining full comprehension of historical 
facts, this ability to revisit testimony can provide significant value.  
Here, again, everyday analogies abound.  A second viewing of a play or 
a movie, for example, will reveal details and nuances missed in the 
first viewing.  The viewer has to expend less effort simply following 
the story and can thus allocate more attention to the details.  
Moreover, the repeat viewer knows where the story will lead, and as a 
 
 70. “Writing freezes oral utterances in place, and prevents a ‘system of elimination’ from 
operating.  It is the permanence of words when they are in written form that gives rise to the 
hallmark of logical analysis, sequential thought, and the development of syllogisms.” Bergman, 
supra note 31, at 525. 
 71. See ONG, supra note 32, at 39-40 (discussing the differences between written and oral 
discourse). 
Thought requires some sort of continuity.  Writing establishes in the text a “line” of 
continuity outside the mind.  If distraction confuses or obliterates from the mind the 
context out of which emerges the material I am now reading, the context can be 
retrieved by glancing back over the text selectively.  Backlooping can be entirely 
occasional, purely ad hoc.  The mind concentrates its own energies on moving ahead 
because what it backloops into lies quiescent outside itself, always available piecemeal 
on the inscribed page.  
Id. at 39. 
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result knows which details are worthy of that attention. Certainly this 
analogy is not perfect. Trials are structured to address this limitation 
through the mechanism of the opening statement, which allows 
counsel to tell the jury where they believe the story will lead, and thus 
to provide jurors with some guidance concerning which details will be 
important.  But counsel does not know exactly where the story will 
lead.  Evidentiary rulings remain to be made, some of which could 
significantly impact how the trial unfolds.  Witnesses may not testify 
as anticipated—a phenomenon more likely to occur in criminal trials, 
where pre-trial discovery is limited.  What is more, the evidence in a 
trial almost necessarily comes in a cumbersome, disjointed fashion, 
presented witness-by-witness rather than according to chronology or 
some similar organizing principle.  And much of the testimony is noise 
that is necessary to satisfy evidentiary prerequisites but at best 
tangentially useful in resolving the core disputes.72  On balance, the 
format of a trial seems as likely to impede the fact finder’s ability to 
analyze the evidence as to enhance it. 
The appellate court’s reliance on a transcript provides a final, 
less apparent advantage.  As noted above, written text triggers a 
different thought process than oral language, one that is considerably 
more amenable to logical and abstract operations.73  For example, the 
use of syllogisms, which are a primary tool of logical thought, arguably 
requires a textual medium.74  Syllogisms may not be merely an act of 
thought, but “an act of graphic representation, in the sense that laying 
out an argument in this way is hardly a characteristic feature of oral 
discourse but . . . is one whose formal presentation depends upon the 
written word.”75  Thus, a transcript not only provides a better set of 
resources for certain types of fact finding, it also facilitates a mode of 
thinking that is more consistent with the ideal of legal thought.  This 
point is easily overstated, however, and so it is important to bear in 
mind that, because the text that the appellate court has to work with 
 
 72. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 901 (establishing a general condition to admissibility that 
exhibits are authenticated “by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims”). 
 73. Indeed, Bergman characterized juror and appellate court thought processes as polar 
opposites.  “[J]ury deliberations and appellate opinions are paradigm examples of the differences 
between oral and written cultures.  They reflect not merely a difference in style, but in the very 
process of reasoning that produces a result.”  Bergman, supra note 31, at 529. 
 74. For discussions of the use of syllogistic reasoning in law, see, for example, STEVEN J. 
BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 43-58 (2d ed. 1995); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 38-42 (1990). Judge Posner notes that “most legal 
questions are resolved syllogistically.”  Id. at 42 (emphasis omitted). 
 75. GOODY, supra note 59, at 279; see also ONG, supra note 32, at 33-34 (discussing the 
difficulties facing a member of a primarily oral culture seeking to work through a complex 
problem). 
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was not designed to be text, there are limitations on the operations the 
appellate court can perform with it.  In other words, because the 
words in a transcript were used as part of oral communication, there 
remains the possibility that the words themselves do not 
autonomously represent the speaker’s meaning.76  Failure to 
appreciate this point might lead to the misinterpretation of testimony 
the meaning of which was, because the speaker employed cues not 
reflected in the transcript, clear to the trial-level fact finder.  Even so, 
the larger point remains that its recourse to the text places the 
appellate court in the best position to think logically and abstractly 
about the testimony and evidence in a case.  To return to the example 
of syllogisms, while the witness testimony reflected in a transcript is 
unlikely to contain explicit syllogistic components, the textual form of 
the information allows the reviewing court to reorder the 
information.77  It can thereby test whether the information works as a 
syllogism, or at least whether it is consistent with a workable 
syllogism, and thus with logic. Abstract and logical thought, of course, 
is characteristic of our legal system.78 
2. Witness Demeanor 
As noted above, at the very core of the institutional competence 
justification for appellate deference is the notion that the jurors or the 
trial judge, who were actually present when the witnesses testified, 
enjoyed a far superior position from which to assess such things as 
credibility of those witnesses. The assumption underlying this 
justification, however, is flawed.  Research consistently shows that 
people perform poorly at using demeanor to determine whether a 
person is telling the truth.79  This is not because liars do not engage in 
types of behavior that, properly interpreted, are suggestive of 
 
 76. Olson notes: “To serve the requirements of written language . . . all of the information 
relevant to the communication of intention must be present in the text.  Further, if the text is to 
permit or sustain certain conclusions . . . then it must become an autonomous representation of 
meaning.”  Olson, supra note 31, at 277. 
 77. See GOODY, supra note 59, at 276-77. 
 78. See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 
366 (1978) (“Adjudication is, then, a device which gives formal and institutional expression to the 
influence of reasoned argument in human affairs.  As such it assumes a burden of rationality not 
borne by any other form of social ordering.”). 
 79. See Paul Ekman, Lying and Deception, in MEMORY FOR EVERYDAY AND EMOTIONAL 
EVENTS 333 (Nancy L. Stein et al. eds., 1997); Aldert Vrij, Nonverbal Communication and 
Credibility, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: TRUTHFULNESS, ACCURACY AND CREDIBILITY 32 (Amina 
Memon et al. eds., 1998); Blumenthal, supra note 36, at 1189-1200; Saul M. Kassin, Human 
Judges of Truth, Deception, and Credibility: Confident but Erroneous, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 809 
(2002). 
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deception, but rather because people focus on the wrong cues.  
Observers tend to focus on facial expressions, which are highly 
manipulable and therefore unreliable, rather than on speech patterns, 
which are better indicators of deception.80  When the speaker and the 
observer are of different races or cultures, even more opportunities for 
mistranslation may exist, since behavioral cues thought to signal 
sincerity in one culture may be taken as signs of deception by 
members of another culture.81  Even those who might be expected to 
have well-developed abilities to separate the lying from the truthful, 
such as law enforcement officers, forensic psychiatrists, lawyers, and 
judges, perform at little better than chance level in experimental 
settings.82  What is more, there is no correlation between a person’s 
confidence in her judgment that a person is lying and the accuracy of 
that judgment.83  In short, the experimental evidence strongly 
suggests that the ability to observe demeanor is of no value in 
assessing witness credibility. 
Of course, some caution is warranted in transferring these 
experimental findings to the trial setting.  The design of trials might 
have some ameliorating effect.84 In contrast to the experiments 
conducted to date, testimony at trials generally fits (or fails to fit) into 
a larger evidentiary context and is subject to cross-examination, both 
of which might allow for greater assessment of credibility on 
substantive grounds.  The fact that juries make decisions as a group, 
including (at least implicitly) whether to credit testimony, might also 
be thought to provide some check on the ability of a witness to carry 
out a successful deceit.  Yet those commentators who have considered 
 
 80. Kassin, supra note 79, at 810 (citing studies).  Consistent with this assertion, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the blind may be better detectors of falsehood than the sighted.  See 
Oliver Sacks, A Neurologist’s Notebook: The Mind’s Eye: What the Blind See, THE NEW YORKER, 
July 28, 2003, at 48, 56-57 (discussing the heightening of other senses in response to blindness 
and the resulting increased sensitivity to moods in other people). 
 81. See generally Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 
CONN. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 82. Paul Ekman, Why Don’t We Catch Liars?, 63 SOC. RES. 801 (1996).  In one study, 
researchers tested a wide range of people, including law enforcement personnel from the Secret 
Service, CIA, FBI, National Security Agency, and California police departments, using a 
videotape showing ten people who either were lying or telling the truth in describing their 
feelings.  Paul Ekman & Maureen O’Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
913, 913 (1991). Prior assessments of the videotaped subjects established that there were 
measurable behavioral differences between those telling the truth and those lying. Id. at 915. 
Even so, of all the occupational groups tested, only members of the Secret Service performed at a 
rate better than chance. Id. at 913. 
 83. Kassin, supra note 79, at 810 (citing studies). 
 84. See Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1082 (1991) 
(identifying differences between the trial and experimental settings and ultimately rejecting the 
assertion that the design of trials has ameliorating effects). 
   
2004] APPELLATE COURTS, HISTORICAL FACTS 459 
the transferability of the experimental results to the trial setting have 
uniformly concluded that none of these features of trials enhance a 
juror’s ability to decode witness demeanor.  If anything, the trial 
setting may worsen the problem.  Cross-examination may have a 
further distorting effect both because of the typically suspicious tone 
of the questioning, which has been shown to create a suspicious 
mindset in observers, and the stress caused in the witness, which may 
lead her to give off the sorts of behavioral cues that observers 
improperly associate with deception.85  Further research has 
demonstrated that jurors’ collective assessment of witness credibility 
tends to be based on demeanor rather than substance, with no 
suggestion that the dynamics of group decision making do anything to 
improve upon individual shortcomings in performing this task.86 
It turns out that the best method for detecting lies is to listen 
without looking.87  And, contrary to the lore of the legal system, 
research reveals that reading a transcript is a close second-best, with 
those basing their judgments on that basis performing nearly twice as 
effectively at detecting deceit as those exposed to both audio and 
visual cues.88 Purely from the perspective of assessing witness 
credibility, then, there is a strong argument for no appellate deference 
to trial-level fact finders.89 
3. The Advantages of Experience 
Appellate judges may enjoy another competence advantage, at 
least vis-à-vis jurors, based simply on the fact that as repeat 
 
 85. Id. at 1080; see Kassin, supra note 79, at 811-12 (discussing interrogation techniques 
and stating that it is doubtful “that one can easily distinguish between the person who is under 
stress because he is guilty and on the verge of being uncovered and the person who is under 
stress because he is innocent and stands falsely accused.”). 
 86. See Blumenthal, supra note 36, at 1158 (discussing research regarding jury resolution of 
witness disagreement); Wellborn, supra note 84, at 1081 (considering the inability of jury 
deliberation to enhance lie detection skills). 
 87. Blumenthal, supra note 36, at 1203; Kassin, supra note 79, at 810. 
 88. Blumenthal, supra note 36, at 1203. 
 89. Wellborn concluded that  
[s]trictly with regard to accuracy of credibility judgments, the available evidence 
indicates that legal procedures could be improved by abandoning live trial testimony 
in favor of presentation of deposition transcripts.  Transcripts are probably superior to 
live testimony as a basis for credibility judgments because they eliminate distracting, 
misleading, and unreliable nonverbal data and enhance the most reliable data, verbal 
content.  
Wellborn, supra note 84, at 1091.  Blumenthal characterized Wellborn’s claims regarding the 
invalidity of demeanor evidence as “too extreme,” but nonetheless conceded that the superiority 
of assessments based on transcripts over those made by observers exposed to misleading verbal 
cues provides “support for the claim that findings of credibility could be reviewed de novo by 
appellate courts.”  Blumenthal, supra note 36, at 1203 & n.288. 
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participants in the system, they are likely to have greater experience 
with the type of case at hand.90  This provides them with a more 
expansive context in which to assess factual matters, which may lead 
to better, or at least more consistent, fact finding across the range of 
cases. 
Consider, for example, the determination of punitive damages.  
The assessment of the appropriate amount of such damages is an 
almost entirely fact-driven endeavor, involving consideration of such 
factors as “the extent of harm or potential harm caused by the 
defendant’s misconduct, whether the defendant acted in good faith, 
whether the misconduct was an individual instance or part of a 
broader pattern, whether the defendant behaved negligently, 
recklessly, or maliciously.”91  Even so, awards of punitive damages are 
frequently criticized on the ground that they appear to be arbitrary 
and even irrational when viewed across the range of cases.92  Drawing 
on a substantial body of psychological research,93 Cass Sunstein and 
his coauthors, have suggested that this pattern of results is a natural 
function of human cognition.94  Human thought is category bound, 
meaning that people tend to evaluate a given case with reference only 
to other situations involving the same sort of conduct or harm.  This 
leads to inconsistencies between types of cases, since people do not 
naturally call upon their less directly related experiences in making 
their assessments.  “When they consider an individual case of physical 
injury, or commercial fraud, the frame of reference for evaluation is 
usually a set of instances of the same kind of harm.”95  Another 
difficulty arises from what Sunstein and his coauthors called the 
translation problem.  While people do typically share intuitions 
 
 90. In patent law, a disparity in experience and expertise has led to de novo appellate 
review of fact finding.  See Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional 
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2003) (discussing appellate 
de novo review of factual questions in patent cases).  In the patent system, the Federal Circuit 
hears all appeals, and, for this and other reasons, it enjoys a position of comparative fact finding 
superiority vis-à-vis district courts and the Patent and Trademark Office.  See id. at 1040 
(discussing the argument that the Federal Circuit has fact-finding capabilities superior to those 
of the other decision makers in the patent system).  Even so, Rai is critical of this arrangement, 
based in part on the assumption that “appellate courts are hardly equipped for fact finding.” Id. 
 91. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 446 (2001) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). The Court in Cooper took pains to distinguish punitive damages awards from 
other sorts of factual determinations.  Id. at 432-40. 
 92. See David A. Schkade, Erratic by Design: A Task Analysis of Punitive Damages 
Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 121, 121-22 (2002) (discussing criticisms). 
 93. For a representative collection of this work, see CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). 
 94. See generally Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1153 (2002). 
 95. Id. at 1155. 
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regarding the seriousness of harms within a category,96 they do not 
share a sense of how harm ought to translate into a monetary award.  
The factors used to translate the relevant legal concept, such as the 
level of harm to the victim or the blameworthiness of the actor’s state 
of mind, into dollars accordingly vary based on random or irrelevant 
considerations.  As a consequence, juries that likely share an 
assessment of the relative seriousness of their cases might 
nonetheless impose inconsistent punishments because they arrived at 
different translation factors.97 
Sunstein and his coauthors suggested that one of the 
implications of their analysis would be to provide reviewing courts 
with greater authority to assess the appropriateness of punitive 
damage awards on the grounds that, having seen more cases, those 
courts enjoy a superior position from which to place any given case 
within the overall framework of cases.98  Put another way, appellate 
courts could act to ensure at least some level of uniformity in the 
translation factors used by juries across the range of cases.  There are 
limitations to this suggestion, including the fact that judges are 
human and are themselves susceptible to the same sorts of cognitive 
errors that jurors make.99  But so long as the review mechanism is 
structured to require reviewing courts to make the appropriate 
comparisons, providing for enhanced review should lead to greater 
consistency among awards, a point the Supreme Court appears to 
have at least implicitly realized.100 
Similar dynamics exist with respect to other types of issues.  
Consider, for example, eyewitness identification testimony.  In 
criminal cases, misidentifications represent one of the most frequent 
causes of wrongful convictions.101  The literature on the shakiness of 
eyewitness identification testimony is well established, and courts 
have acknowledged the untrustworthiness of this evidence.102  Indeed, 
 
 96. For example, if provided with a set of personal injuries, generally people consistently 
rank the relative seriousness of the injuries.  Id. at 1158. 
 97. Id. at 1167-68. 
 98. Id. at 1182-83. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Cooper Indus., Inc.  v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001) 
(noting that courts reviewing a punitive damage award must assess its consistency with “civil 
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases” and concluding that this evaluation “which 
calls for a broad legal comparison, seems more suited to the expertise of appellate courts” 
relative to trial courts). 
 101. See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE app. at 263 (2000) (showing that in fifty-
two out of sixty-two cases involving wrongful convictions, mistaken identification was a factor). 
 102. In the words of Justice Frankfurter: 
What is the worth of identification testimony even when uncontradicted?  The 
identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy.  The hazards of such 
   
462 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:2:437 
some courts have at least suggested that convictions based largely on 
eyewitness testimony might be subjected to greater scrutiny in the 
context of sufficiency review.103  There is, in short, a good deal of 
judicial experience with this issue.  Jurors, even though instructed on 
the evaluation of eyewitness testimony,104 lack the broader suspicion 
of this evidence necessary to engage in a consistent or sophisticated 
evaluation of it.  This is exacerbated by the jury’s susceptibility to the 
dangers associated with the evaluation of demeanor evidence.  That is, 
the jury might be swayed by a witness’ confident statement of 
identification, and fail to focus on factors that call the statement into 
question. 
This is not to suggest that appellate courts enjoy a competence 
advantage with respect to all eyewitness testimony.  There will, of 
course, be many cases in which the identification testimony is not 
questionable, such as when the witness identified someone whom he 
or she knew previously or when the witness had a sufficient 
opportunity to view the perpetrator of the crime.  As a result, it will 
not be the case that every trial involving eyewitness testimony will 
present either the need or the opportunity for greater factual scrutiny 
by an appellate court.  But when the identification occurs under 
questionable circumstances, such as when the lighting was poor, or 
 
testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of 
English and American trials.  These instances are recent—not due to the brutalities of 
ancient criminal procedure. 
FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 30 (1927).  Twenty years ago the Second 
Circuit stated the problem as follows: 
There can be no reasonable doubt that inaccurate eyewitness testimony may be one of 
the most prejudicial features of a criminal trial.  Juries, naturally desirous to punish a 
vicious crime, may well be unschooled in the effects that the subtle compound of 
suggestion, anxiety, and forgetfulness in the face of the need to recall often has on 
witnesses.  Accordingly, doubts over the strength of the evidence of a defendant’s guilt 
may be resolved on the basis of the eyewitness’ seeming certainty when he points to 
the defendant and exclaims with conviction that veils all doubt, “That’s the man!” 
Kampshoff v. Smith, 698 F.2d 581, 585 (2d Cir. 1983) (footnote and citation omitted).  Thus, 
“while juries may be led by their experience to believe their eyes, and, by inference, what they 
hear from those who have seen, the experience of law and psychology has been that eyewitness 
testimony may sometimes be the least trustworthy means to identify the guilty.”  Id. 
 103. See, e.g., State v. Walker, 310 N.W.2d 89, 90 (Minn. 1981) (“[W]e have recognized that 
not all single eyewitness cases are the same and have emphasized that when the single witness’ 
identification of a defendant is made after only fleeting or limited observation, corroboration is 
required if the conviction is to be sustained.”); State v. Ani, 257 N.W.2d 699, 700 (Minn. 1977) 
(suggesting more broadly that “ ‘[t]he absence of corroboration in an individual case . . . may well 
call for a holding that there is insufficient evidence upon which a jury could find the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (quoting Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal 
Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1391 (1972) (emphasis omitted))). 
 104. See, e.g., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS 
OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT §4.14 (2000) (describing factors for jurors to consider in evaluating 
eyewitness identification testimony). 
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when the witness had only a brief glimpse of the perpetrator, the 
appellate court’s superior learning on the fallibility of such testimony 
may make it appropriate for the court to consider whether the 
testimony ought to be given much credence. 
4. Circumstantial and Documentary Evidence 
Historically, courts reviewing cases in equity had the broad 
ability to reconsider factual as well as legal matters.105  More recently, 
the most express recognition of the role that appellate courts can play 
in assessing evidentiary weight has appeared in the context of 
convictions based in part on circumstantial or documentary evidence; 
in each context the appellate courts have, at one time or another, 
expressly assumed the right to review those portions of the evidence 
anew.  Further, in each situation the stated justification centers on 
appellate courts’ institutional competence to deal with the type of 
evidence at issue. 
Circumstantial evidence is, of course, to be contrasted with 
direct evidence, with the distinction turning on “whether or not the 
evidence requires the trier to reach the ultimate factual proposition to 
which the evidence is addressed by a process of inference.”106  Thus, 
for example, testimony that a witness saw the defendant committing 
an assault is direct evidence that he did so, while testimony that the 
defendant possessed the weapon used in the assault is circumstantial 
evidence of the same proposition.  In the latter situation, the jury 
must not only consider whether to credit the testimony, but also 
whether and to what extent the information testified to, if believed, 
supports the conclusion that the defendant was in fact the assailant.  
In some federal courts in the past,107 and in some states even now,108 
 
 105. Clark & Stone, supra note 2, at 190; see Christie, supra note 3, at 16 n.5. 
 106. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 48 (3d ed. 1996). 
 107. For a detailed history, see Robert J. Gregory, Whose Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering 
the Appropriate Role of the Reviewing Court in the Criminal Decision Making Process, 24 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 911, 940-57 (1987) (discussing the role of inferences and the standard of review); 
see also 2 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 9.06 (discussing the “hypothesis of innocence” 
doctrine). 
 108. In Minnesota, for example, the articulated standard is as follows: 
[A] conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny than 
convictions based in part on direct evidence.  In such cases “the circumstantial 
evidence must do more than give rise to suspicion of guilt; ‘it must point unerringly to 
the accused’s guilt.’ ”  . . . [O]n appeal a conviction based on circumstantial evidence 
may stand “only where the facts and circumstances disclosed by the circumstantial 
evidence form a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so 
directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any 
reasonable inference other than that of guilt.” 
State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Minn. 1994) (citations omitted).  
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appellate courts reviewing convictions based on circumstantial 
evidence did so under a standard pursuant to which the court was to 
consider whether guilt was the only reasonable hypothesis flowing 
from the evidence.109  This standard assumes that an appellate court 
is as qualified to draw inferences from circumstances as a trial judge 
or jury, because the process of reasoning from the circumstantial 
evidence to the conclusion that the relevant element of the offense was 
satisfied involves only reasoning, and not any of the weighing or 
assessing of evidence thought to be within the particular competence 
of the jury.  Thus, while it would remain the province of the jury to 
determine whether to believe the testimony that the defendant 
possessed the weapon, the appellate court would be entitled to 
consider anew whether the only rational inference from his possession 
of the weapon is that he committed the crime.  When circumstantial 
evidence provided a material portion of the government’s support for 
an ultimate fact in the case, then, the appellate court would have an 
appropriate role in determining whether that evidence established 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.110 
The second context where the appellate courts have expressly 
assumed the right to review evidence anew involves documentary 
evidence.  Written evidence, of course, has no demeanor, nor does the 
fact finder enjoy any other advantages as a result of being present in 
the courtroom when such evidence is introduced.111  In consequence, 
some courts have taken the position that when evidence is in written 
form—be it a document or a transcript of deposition testimony—an 
appellate court is just as competent to assess that evidence as is a trial 
court, and therefore ought to be able to do so.112  Perhaps because 
criminal cases are considerably less likely to involve situations in 
which a material portion of the evidence is documentary, this 
exception to the general rule of appellate deference has only been 
developed to a significant degree in the civil context,113 and there 
primarily in the context of appellate review of the trial judge’s factual 
findings.114 As has happened with cases based on circumstantial 
 
 109. For a thorough discussion of the history of this standard and an argument that it ought 
to be revived, see generally Gregory, supra note 107. 
 110. See id. at 951-52 (summarizing the applicable standard). 
 111. Indeed, some courts advanced this reasoning even beyond written evidence to include 
any undisputed witness testimony.  1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 2.09(B) (2d ed. 1992). 
 112. See Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary or 
Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REV. 506, 518-20 (1963) (discussing the “gloss” approach). 
 113. For a criminal case considering the exception, see United States v. Jabara, 644 F.2d 
574, 577 (6th Cir. 1981) (refusing to review the record de novo). 
 114. See generally 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 111, § 2.09. 
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evidence, federal courts have almost completely returned to the 
position of appellate deference in this context,115 with a few states still 
implementing the exception.116  The point, however, is not whether 
courts continue to apply these rules.  It is that courts have recognized 
that there are situations in which appellate courts are at least as 
competent as trial-level fact finders when it comes to assessing 
evidence. 
Here, too, the logic underlying greater appellate scrutiny can 
be extended to cover analogous forms of evidence,117 such as certain 
types of hearsay.  The classic definition of hearsay is an “out of court 
statement. . . ‘offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’”118  
Among the reasons for the general exclusion of hearsay is the absence 
of a testifying witness for the jury to evaluate.  “A testifying witness 
gives her evidence on the stand under the gaze of the trier of fact, and 
her demeanor provides valuable clues about meaning and 
credibility.”119  Yet much of what falls within the classic definition of 
hearsay is admitted under one of the many exceptions to the rule.120  
While a jury might have an opportunity to assess the hearsay 
declarant’s demeanor–a statement that falls within the definition is 
 
 115. The Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to address this situation expressly.  See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(A) (providing that “[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous”); see also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 
470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (rejecting, prior to amendment of Rule 52, the contention that it allows 
for less deferential review of documentary evidence); 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 111, § 
2.09(D) (discussing the amendment of Rule 52 and recent cases).  For a recent example of a court 
dealing with one of the lingering effects of its prior body of law regarding the review of 
documentary evidence, see Zervos v. Verizon New York, Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 167-72 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(discussing the implications of the now-displaced “Orvis” rule, under which a district court’s 
factual determinations are reviewed de novo). 
 116. See, e.g., Cane & Long, supra note 39 (criticizing the continued differential treatment of 
documentary evidence on appeal in Wisconsin). 
 117. Other possibilities might include: cases involving accomplice testimony, see, e.g., Arthur 
L. Alarcon, J., Suspect Evidence: Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements and Uncorroborated 
Accomplice Testimony, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 953, 953 (1992) (noting that, in such cases, “the 
question whether a conviction rests on sufficient evidence is perhaps one of the most troubling in 
appellate review” and lamenting the appellate court’s lack of ability to reweigh such evidence), 
cases involving other bad acts evidence admitted under one of the exceptions to the general 
prohibition set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and cases where evidence has been 
introduced subject to a limiting instruction charging the jury not to use the evidence for 
impermissible purposes, see CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 
1.16 (3d ed. 2003) (noting the concern that limiting instructions, beyond merely being ineffective 
as prophylactics, might “do more to sensitize the jury to evidence than to dispel the risk that the 
jury will misuse it”). 
 118. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 123 
(4th ed. 2000). 
 119. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 117, § 8.3, at 698. 
 120. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 118, at 124. 
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hearsay even if the declarant testifies as a witness at trial—it might 
not.121 
When the hearsay statement of a non-testifying witness is 
allowed into evidence, the situation is analogous to that of 
documentary evidence.122  The jury has received a statement that is 
not accompanied by any of the contextual cues that we look to juries to 
unravel.  What it has, in other words, is at best nothing better than 
what an appellate court can obtain by reading a transcript.  At worst, 
the jury could be misled by the demeanor of the witness who testifies 
to the content of the hearsay statement, attributing its assessment of 
the credibility of the witness to the actual declarant.  Either way, the 
reviewing court would be competent to assess this testimony, and 
based on that assessment to evaluate the sufficiency of the entirety of 
the evidence supporting the conviction. 
C. Institutional Competence and the Role of Appellate Courts in 
Reviewing Facts 
It is clear that institutional competence, typically the only 
justification offered in favor of appellate deference to trial-level fact 
finders, fails to explain all, or perhaps even most, of the deference 
purportedly accorded pursuant to the standards governing such 
review.  This is not to suggest that there are no fact-finding tasks that 
juries and trial judges perform better than appellate courts, but rather 
that both the category of such tasks and, in many cases, the 
magnitude of the competency advantage are considerably smaller than 
generally acknowledged.  Nor does the at least partial failure of the 
institutional competence justification suggest that other factors might 
not justify some degree of appellate deference. But it does suggest the 
need for reexamination of the governing standards, and for 
consideration of adjustments in light of that analysis.  The next Part 
takes up that project. 
 
 121. The exceptions to the general hearsay prohibition contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 
803 apply regardless of whether the declarant is available to testify at trial, and those contained 
in Federal Rule of Evidence 804 apply only if the declarant is not available. 
 122. Indeed, most documentary evidence would qualify as hearsay.  See MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 117, § 8.1, at 694-95 (“[T]he hearsay doctrine embraces not just oral 
statements, but written ones too.”). 
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II. SUFFICIENCY REVIEW IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES 
Among the various explanations123 for the maintenance of 
separate civil and criminal systems is the notion that, because of the 
greater stakes involved in criminal litigation, greater procedural 
safeguards are required.  Justice Harlan nicely summarized this 
viewpoint in his concurring opinion in In re Winship.124  Building on 
the observation that the standard of proof utilized by the trier of fact 
affects the comparative frequency of false positive and false negative 
outcomes,125 he noted that “the reason for different standards of proof 
in civil as opposed to criminal litigation [is] apparent.”126  Civil suits 
typically involve two private parties disputing whether one owes 
money damages to the other.  In that context, Harlan continued, “we 
view it as no more serious in general for there to be an erroneous 
verdict in the defendant’s favor than for there to be an erroneous 
verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.”127  The preponderance of the evidence 
standard is thus appropriate in the civil context because it has little if 
any tendency to generate erroneous verdicts disproportionately in 
favor of plaintiffs or defendants.  “In a criminal case, on the other 
hand, we do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent 
man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is 
guilty.”128  We instead view human liberty as a transcendent interest, 
and accordingly seek to reduce the number of erroneous 
determinations against defendants by requiring the government to 
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.129 
This asymmetric concern for factual accuracy in criminal cases 
suggests that any disparity between appellate courts’ willingness to 
reexamine facts in the context of a challenge to the sufficiency of the 
evidence in the criminal context versus the civil context would run in 
 
 123. For a brief overview of the justifications for the maintenance of the two systems, see 
Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 
202-09 (1996). 
 124. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368-75 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 125. Id. at 370-71 (“In a lawsuit between two parties, a factual error can make a difference in 
one of two ways.  First, it can result in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff when the true facts 
warrant a judgment for the defendant.  The analogue in a criminal case would be the conviction 
of an innocent man.  On the other hand, an erroneous factual determination can result in a 
judgment for the defendant when the true facts justify a judgment in plaintiff’s favor.  The 
criminal analogue would be the acquittal of a guilty man.  The standard of proof influences the 
relative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes.”). 
 126. Id. at 371. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 372. 
 129. Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958)). 
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favor of greater scrutiny in the former setting.130  There, the benefit 
arising from any enhancement in factual accuracy—the reversal of a 
wrongful conviction—is high, presumably high enough to offset even a 
substantial investment of systemic resources toward its achievement.  
Moreover, even if the appellate court errs—resulting in the reversal of 
a just conviction—the cost of that error is regarded as comparatively 
low, merely a tenth the value of the corresponding gain according to 
the common formulation,131 if not less.  So far as accommodation of 
this dynamic is concerned, then, it suggests that appellate courts 
ought to be relatively aggressive in attempting to achieve greater 
factual accuracy. 
Civil cases involve no such asymmetry.  The benefit of a correct 
reversal based on factual reconsideration—reversing, say, a verdict 
against a defendant who ought not have been held liable—is roughly, 
if not exactly, the same as the cost of an erroneous reversal, at least 
over the run of cases.  This suggests that appellate review ought to be 
comparatively less aggressive, perhaps restricted to those situations in 
which the appellate contribution to accuracy is reasonably certain. 
To be sure, factual accuracy is not the only end of either civil or 
criminal litigation, nor is assuring correct results in individual cases 
the only function of appellate review.132  Many other considerations 
might lead to the conclusion that appellate courts should avoid factual 
assessment even as to matters on which they enjoy clear superiority. 
Accordingly, this Part examines both the doctrinal and functional 
treatment of fact finding in both the civil and criminal contexts. 
Although many potential opportunities for factual reconsideration 
arise on appeal,133 the focus here is primarily on appellate treatment 
of claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the 
verdict rendered.  Though such claims are often characterized as 
involving questions of “ultimate fact,” they also serve as the primary 
mechanism through which appellate courts oversee the historical fact-
 
 130. Cf. Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal 
Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723, 729 (1993) (outlining arguments for why divisions of 
decisional authority between juries and courts ought generally to be the same in the civil and 
criminal settings). 
 131.   See supra note 17. 
 132. See Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal 
Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 247-56 (1991) 
(considering the argument that the only proper role for appellate courts is to develop and 
maintain the uniformity of legal doctrine). 
 133. Harmless error review represents another situation where the recognition of appellate 
fact-finding capabilities could have a significant impact, particularly given that appellate courts 
are arguably more involved in fact assessment in that context than in the context of sufficiency 
review.  See infra text accompanying notes 222-224. 
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finding process,134 since they place the appellate court in the position 
of potentially displacing the jury as to the performance of its core 
function.  This Part thus discusses the formulation of the applicable 
standards of review and courts’ application of those standards.  
Evidence concerning that application suggests, contrary to the 
hypothesis set forth above, that appellate courts are quite willing to 
reexamine the work of juries and trial judges in civil cases, while they 
almost never do so in criminal cases.  The analysis proceeds to 
consider whether factors other than institutional competence might 
account for either the formulation of the standards or their manner of 
application.  On the criminal side, these questions have not been 
thoroughly explored, and the discussion here considers them in detail.  
On the civil side, in contrast, a number of recent scholarly articles 
have examined these issues.  The discussion here relies heavily on 
that work, and as a consequence is relatively brief. 
A. Insufficiency of the Evidence in Criminal Appeals 
Although both the original Constitution135 and the Bill of 
Rights136 provide for jury trial in criminal cases, there are important 
differences between these provisions and the Seventh Amendment’s 
guarantee of the right to jury trial in civil cases.  The Seventh 
Amendment specifically prohibits reexamination of jury fact finding,137 
whereas the Sixth Amendment does not.  Perhaps more 
fundamentally, the structure created by the Bill of Rights allows for 
asymmetric reexamination in criminal cases.  Thus, “[i]f a properly 
instructed jury voted to convict, a judge could set aside the conviction, 
but if that jury voted to acquit, reexamination was barred.”138  And 
while notions of democratic participation and public education may 
have played a role in the formulation of the Sixth Amendment just as 
in the Seventh,139 the Court has held that the right to a jury trial is a 
 
 134. Louis, supra note 22, at 1019. 
 135.“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”  U.S. CONST. 
art III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 136. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 137. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a 
jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of the common law.”). 
 138. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 97 (1998). 
 139. Id. at 104, 110-13. 
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criminal defendant’s alone.140  Thus, the Constitution presents no 
obstacle to appellate reexamination of the facts supporting a 
conviction. 
Indeed, in the 1930s (when the problem of wrongful convictions 
last garnered the sort of widespread interest it receives today),141 
proposals for appellate review of the facts underlying convictions were 
prevalent,142 and assumed the appropriateness and power on the part 
of the appellate court to revisit anew such matters as witness 
credibility.143 Lester Orfield identified four proposals for implementing 
appellate review of facts, ranging from appellate examination of “all 
the facts set out in the full record of the proceedings below,” as the 
narrowest form, to “a complete retrial of the case,” as the broadest.144  
Intermediate approaches would have allowed appellate courts to call 
new witnesses or receive other evidence not considered in the trial 
court in limited circumstances.145  All of these proposals would have 
compelled substantial appellate engagement in the fundamental 
question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and would likewise 
have required little deference to the determinations of the trial-level 
fact finder. 
Given the practical implications of Orfield’s proposed review 
mechanisms, it is not surprising that they have not been offered in the 
current debate as realistic solutions to the wrongful convictions 
problem.  In part, this has to do with the increased burden such 
 
 140. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288-89, 299 (1930). 
 141. Widespread interest in the problem of wrongful convictions in the 1930s appears to have 
been largely the result of the Sacco-Vanzetti case, together with the publication of Edwin 
Borchard’s Convicting the Innocent in 1932.  See Leonard J. Shapiro, Criminal Appeal on the 
Facts and the Federal Judicial System, 34 ILL. L. REV. 332, 332 (1939) (attributing interest in the 
issue to the Sacco-Vanzetti case). 
 142. ORFIELD, supra note 34, at 77-91; Blume, supra note 35, at 71-72; Shapiro, supra note 
141, at 342. The American Law Institute’s proposed Code of Criminal Procedure provided that 
“the appellate court shall review the evidence to determine if it is insufficient to support the 
judgment where this is a ground of appeal and may review the evidence whether its insufficiency 
is a ground of appeal or not.”  AM. LAW INST., CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 457(2) (Official 
Draft 1930). 
 143. See ORFIELD, supra note 34, at 81-82 (contrasting review for sufficiency with review of 
the facts, which includes a review of such things as witness credibility). 
 144. Id. at 82-83; see also Shapiro, supra note 141, at 342. 
 145. In an intermediate form, and the form in which it is most commonly referred to in 
England it would mean review of the whole record, with a power in the appellate court 
to call new witnesses where there is doubt, or obscurity, or overlooking.  A slight 
variant of review merely of the full record is to allow the appellate court to receive 
evidence not offered below, provided the issue is “capable of proof by record or other 
incontrovertible evidence.”  A highly interesting, but perhaps impracticable proposal, 
is that of permitting the appellate court, like the pardoning authority or an 
administrative tribunal, to call on the prosecuting attorney or on the police directly to 
make inquiries for their information.   
ORFIELD, supra note 34, at 82-83. 
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review would impose on appellate courts.  Consider Orfield’s 
narrowest alternative.  If all of the facts remained entirely open to 
reconsideration in the appeal of every conviction, then every appeal—
even one limited to reconsideration of the facts that were before the 
jury—could potentially include a claim that would succeed if the 
appellate court could be persuaded to adopt a different interpretation 
of the evidence than the jury did.  Given that appeals are without cost 
to most criminal defendants,146 adoption of even this alternative would 
arguably result in a substantially increased burden on appellate 
courts as a result of an increased number of such claims, coupled with 
the greater investment of judicial resources required to reassess 
witness credibility and thus properly adjudicate the claims.147  
Orfield’s broader proposals, all of which would involve the reviewing 
court to some degree in the consideration of new evidence, would 
certainly increase the appellate burden.  In a world where the dockets 
of appellate courts have grown to the point where commentators 
routinely speak of a “crisis of volume,”148 proposals that bring the 
possibility of a significant increase in the courts’ workload simply do 
not represent realistic avenues for reform. 
1. Jackson v. Virginia and the Prevailing Standard of Review 
The prevailing standard by which appellate courts evaluate 
insufficiency claims in the criminal context was first articulated by the 
Court in Jackson v. Virginia.149  The precise question before the Court 
concerned whether its holding in In re Winship150 had any implications 
 
 146. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United 
States, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1995, at 31-32 (noting that in many jurisdictions up to 
90 percent of defendants are represented by indigent defense programs).  This is not to say that 
every defendant would make such a claim, even were they allowed.  While the appeal may cost 
nothing to the defendant, and thus it makes sense from his perspective to make the argument 
even if it is likely to fail, the limited resources of appointed counsel make it unlikely that well-
developed arguments on these grounds would, as a practical matter, appear in most appeals. 
 147. As this Article argues below, it is not entirely clear that the effort involved in assessing 
these claims would, in fact, be significantly greater than that involved in many other sorts of 
claims that appellate courts routinely address.  See infra text accompanying notes 223-224.  It is 
not clear that many defendants choosing to raise a factual claim would not substitute it for, 
rather than add it to, the claim or claims that they would have made if factual review were not 
available.  Even so, the mere possibility that the sort of factual review contemplated by Orfield 
would dramatically increase the burden on appellate courts makes its adoption inconceivable in 
the present environment. 
 148. See, e.g., DANIEL J. MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, 
PROCESSES AND PERSONNEL 329-545 (1994) (discussing the “crisis of volume” and the various 
responses to it). 
 149. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
 150. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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for the manner in which appellate courts are to review insufficiency of 
the evidence claims.  In Winship the Court held “that the Due Process 
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged.”151  The problem facing the Court in 
Jackson, then, was how this requirement was to be implemented.  On 
the one hand, due process could require merely that the fact finder be 
accurately instructed that it must apply the reasonable doubt 
standard, which was the position that the courts of appeals had 
generally taken.152  Under this view, the reviewing court’s role would 
be limited to applying the test of Thompson v. City of Louisville, which 
allowed for reversal only if there was “no evidence” in the record to 
support the conviction.153  On the other hand, due process could 
require reviewing courts to determine not only whether some evidence 
existed in support of a conviction, but further whether that evidence 
met the constitutional standards articulated in Winship.  The Court 
chose the latter alternative.  To the majority it was “clear”154 that the 
logic of Winship requires something more than a “trial ritual.”155  
Because even properly instructed juries will sometimes convict156 
when the evidence does not support the conclusion of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, “[a] doctrine establishing so fundamental a 
substantive constitutional standard must also require that the fact 
finder will rationally apply that standard to the facts in evidence.”157 
It is difficult to divine, however, exactly how the Court 
intended that this requirement be implemented.  As one commentator 
put it: “[o]ther than conveying the obvious—that the reviewing court 
does not retry the case—the Court’s pronouncement provides little 
 
 151. Id. at 364. 
 152. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316. 
 153. Thompson involved convictions for loitering and disorderly conduct, based entirely on 
evidence that police officers observed Thompson dancing alone in a café where he had been for 
approximately thirty minutes while waiting for a bus and evidence that Thompson questioned 
officers after his arrest. 362 U.S. 199, 200 (1960). The Court’s opinion in the case contains little 
constitutional analysis.  See generally 362 U.S. 199. Instead, from a thorough review of the scant 
evidence in the record and the ordinances on which the charges were based the Court concluded 
that there was “no evidence in the record whatever to support these convictions” and that 
Thompson’s convictions must be reversed because it is “a violation of due process to convict and 
punish a man without evidence of his guilt.”  Id. at 206.  For a standard comparable to that in 
Thompson, see American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 787 n.4 (1946), and 
Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944). 
 154. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314. 
 155. Id. at 316-17. 
 156. “[A]nd the same may be said of a trial judge sitting as a jury.”  Id. at 317.  Indeed, 
Jackson actually involved a bench trial.  The Court expressly indicated that whether a judge or 
jury was the trier of fact had no bearing on the standard the court should apply.  Id. at 317 n.8. 
 157. Id. at 317. 
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guidance regarding [an appellate] court’s proper role in the criminal 
decision making process.”158  The Jackson opinion contains at least 
nine sentences or fragments thereof that can be viewed as reflecting 
the opinion’s core proposition, and they are not entirely consistent.159  
Indeed, this inconsistency formed the basis of much of the criticism of 
the Jackson decision.  Because the Court did not clearly outline the 
parameters of the standard it adopted, each of the possibly key 
phrases in the opinion can be read to require a somewhat different 
focus on the part of reviewing courts. 
Judge Newman of the Second Circuit, for example, has 
observed that Jackson conveys two “quite different thoughts.”160  He 
 
 158. Gregory, supra note 107, at 912. 
 159. In the order in which these sentences appear: (1) The Court notes at the end of the first 
section of the opinion that it granted certiorari to consider the claim that “a federal habeas 
corpus court must consider not whether there was any evidence to support a state-court 
conviction, but whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of the facts to find 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 312-13.  (2) In the penultimate sentence of the next 
paragraph, we learn that “the question to be decided in this case is whether any rational fact 
finder could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing for which the petitioner 
was convicted was premeditated.”  Id. at 313.  (3) The first sentence of the next paragraph 
heralds this as the first case “to expressly consider the question whether the due process 
standard recognized in Winship constitutionally protects an accused against conviction except 
upon evidence that is sufficient fairly to support a conclusion that every element of the crime has 
been established beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 313-14.  (4) Following a review of the 
pedigree of Winship and a consideration of prevailing approaches in the federal courts of appeals, 
the Court reasons that “[a] doctrine establishing so fundamental a substantive constitutional 
standard must also require that the fact finder will rationally apply that standard to the facts in 
evidence.”  Id. at 317.  (5) Thus, because the “reasonable doubt” standard is based upon reason, a 
jury verdict upon evidence upon which “no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt” requires reversal.  Id.  (6) Moreover, because federal courts must assess even 
historic facts when examining the application of constitutional standards to state-court 
convictions, the Court proclaims that Winship compels that “the critical inquiry on review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine 
whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could 
reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 318.  (7) In limitation of 
the preceding sentence, however, the Court disclaims any requirement that appellate courts 
review the evidence anew.  “Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 319.  (8) In considering the 
state’s statutory argument that sufficiency claims ought not to be cognizable on habeas, the 
Court states, “[I]t is clear that a state prisoner who alleges that the evidence in support of his 
state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to 
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has stated a federal constitutional claim.”  Id. at 321.  (9) 
Finally, in wrapping up its consideration of the statutory argument, the Court holds that an 
“applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced 
at trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 
324. 
 160. Newman, supra note 17, at 987.  Justice Stevens also observed that the majority opinion 
in Jackson referenced two arguably distinct standards without either acknowledging the 
difference or choosing between them.  443 U.S. at 334 n.8 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also 
Diane Kutzko, Comment, The Jackson v. Virginia Standard for Sufficiency of the Evidence, 65 
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focused on two sentences in the opinion.  The first is the Court’s 
statement that “[a]fter Winship the critical inquiry . . . must be . . . 
whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”161  Judge Newman viewed this 
sentence as setting forth what he characterizes as the more traditional 
test, pursuant to which the inquiry is whether a reasonable jury, the 
sort of unitary fictional construct used throughout the law, could have 
found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.162  In the second sentence, the 
Court states that “the relevant question is whether . . . any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”163 Judge Newman argued that this 
formulation, by its incorporation of the word “any,” creates a less 
stringent standard that “shifts the emphasis away from the law’s 
construct of the reasonable jury and conjures up the image of a vast 
random distribution of reasonable juries, with the risk of creating the 
misleading impression that just one of them need be persuaded 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”164 Adding to the confusion over what the 
Court may have meant by the “any rational trier of fact” formulation 
is that it was entirely of the Court’s making.  No such standard had 
previously been used in any American jurisdiction.165 
Another source of confusion stems from the inherent 
slipperiness of the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Although Winship holds that a conviction may only rest on proof that 
meets this standard, and Jackson charges appellate courts with 
ensuring that Winship’s mandate is satisfied, nobody is quite certain 
precisely what the standard means.  The Supreme Court has stayed 
clear of giving any precise content to the term, and has held that the 
Constitution does not require any particular definition of “reasonable 
doubt,” or that it be defined at all, so long as “taken as a whole, the 
 
IOWA L. REV. 799, 800 n.12 (1980) (noting the possibility that the Court articulated two, distinct 
standards). 
 161. 443 U.S. at 318. 
 162. Newman, supra note 17, at 987. 
 163. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 
 164. Newman, supra note 17, at 987; see also 2 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, at 9-6 to 9-
7 (noting the possibility of differences between these and other formulations of the standard). 
 165. Newman, supra note 17, at 992.  Newman notes that, “prior to Jackson, no federal court 
had ever used the phrase ‘any rational trier’ or ‘any rational jury’ in determining whether the 
evidence in a criminal case was sufficient.” Id. at 992. Justice Stevens criticized the majority for 
failing to consider what standards state courts applied at the time.  Jackson, 443 U.S. at 332 n.4 
(Stevens, J., concurring).  Such a consideration would have revealed that some state and federal 
courts utilized standards that incorporated the concept of a rational juror, though not “any” 
rational juror.  See Edward Imwinkelreid, Jackson v. Virginia: Reopening the Pandora’s Box of 
the Legal Sufficiency of Drug Identification Evidence, 73 KY. L.J. 1, 17-22 (1984) (discussing the 
pre-Jackson standards for assessing the legal sufficiency of prosecution evidence). 
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instructions . . . correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt to the 
jury.”166  Indeed, some courts have gone so far as to prohibit, or at 
least strongly discourage, lower courts and prosecutors from 
attempting to further define the standard.167 
The imprecision of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard 
suggests that it will be interpreted inconsistently from one jury to the 
next, a hypothesis supported by empirical research.168 This 
imprecision creates problems for an appellate court attempting to 
apply a standard of review that requires it to determine whether a 
 
 166. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994).  For a brief history of the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard, see Gregory, supra note 107, at 913-17.  Other courts similarly have shied away 
from attempts to lend content to the reasonable doubt standard beyond that which is conveyed 
by its words and their accumulated baggage.  As Justice Mitchell wrote for the Minnesota 
Supreme Court over a century ago: 
The term “reasonable doubt” is almost incapable of any definition which will add 
much to what the words themselves imply.  In fact it is easier to state what it is not 
than what it is; and it may be doubted whether any attempt to define it will not be 
more likely to confuse than to enlighten a jury. 
State v. Sauer, 38 N.W. 355, 356 (Minn. 1888).  Judge Posner echoed this reasoning in an opinion 
written one hundred years later: 
But ordinarily the district judge will be well advised to attempt no definition of 
reasonable doubt. . . . This advice reflects experience (almost uniformly negative) with 
attempts to define the term rather than a dogmatic insistence on its resistance to 
definition or its self-evident quality.  The verbal elaborations that have been tried 
appear to add little if any substance to the meaning conveyed by the term itself; 
deeply entrenched in the popular culture as it is, the term “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” may be the single legal term that jurors understand best.  Definitions that 
translate the term into a probabilistic measure, while they may add content, are apt 
to mislead the jurors. 
United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1044 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring).  Elsewhere 
Judge Posner has articulated his understanding of the reasonable doubt standard as follows: 
Essentially the jury is told in criminal cases not to convict unless it is certain of the 
defendant’s guilt, with the proviso that it is not to insist on a degree of certainty 
unreasonable in the circumstances (that is, to put aside unreasonable doubts): the 
kind of certainty that attends propositions such as that 2 + 2 = 4 or that cats do not 
grow on trees or that no person born before 1800 is still alive.  
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 213 (1990). 
 167. The Fourth Circuit has held “that trial courts should refrain from charging the jury on 
reasonable doubt unless such guidance is made unavoidable by a specific request from a confused 
jury.” Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470, 479 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds by 475 
U.S. 1138 (1986).  With respect to prosecutorial commentary, the Seventh Circuit has adopted a 
clear prohibition—“we admonish counsel, do not define ‘reasonable doubt’ to a jury.” United 
States v. Alex Janows & Co., 2 F.3d 716, 723 (7th Cir. 1993).  The Eighth Circuit, while not 
categorically barring such argument, has cautioned that “prosecutors would be well advised to 
avoid trying to explain to the jury the meaning of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” United States v. 
Drew, 894 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 1990). But see United States v. Mabry, 3 F.3d 244, 249 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (permitting instruction regarding the reasonable doubt standard). 
 168. See Newman, supra note 17, at 984-85; Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari S. Diamond, The 
Conflict Between Precision and Flexibility in Explaining “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” 6 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 769, 774-78 (2000) (discussing empirical studies on the effect of the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard). 
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jury acted appropriately in convicting on the basis of the evidence 
before it.  If we are not confident enough about what reasonable doubt 
means to define it for a jury, how can we suppose that appellate courts 
can determine whether a jury applied the standard in a rational 
fashion?169  Is there a single, rational interpretation of the standard, 
or might most or all of the interpretations given the standard by juries 
be rational?  The result of empowering appellate courts to review 
convictions under a standard that requires the implementation of a 
concept as ill-defined as reasonable doubt, critics argue, is that the 
courts’ decisions will necessarily be unpredictable and somewhat 
arbitrary.170 
The elusiveness of the concept of beyond a reasonable doubt, 
coupled both with the Jackson opinion’s multi-layered vagueness as to 
the standard it purported to adopt and, more broadly, with 
assumptions about the institutional limitations of appellate courts,171 
led immediately to suggestions that in practice the Jackson standard 
would differ little if at all from the “no evidence” standard of 
Thompson v. City of Louisville.172  Yet the Court in Jackson clearly 
viewed itself as adopting a standard more stringent than that 
required by Thompson.  A significant portion of the Jackson opinion is 
devoted to distinguishing between both the issues presented in the 
two cases and the constitutional underpinnings of their respective 
holdings.  Thompson, the Court noted, was grounded in the due 
process prohibition against arbitrariness,173 and the Thompson Court 
expressly stated that it was not considering the case before it in terms 
of sufficiency of the evidence.174  Jackson’s holding, in contrast, follows 
from Winship, which is based on the separate guarantee that no 
conviction can be had except upon sufficient proof.175  Indeed, Jackson 
himself did not contend that he would have a valid claim under the 
Thompson standard.176  The Court accepted this reasoning, specifically 
noting that the “no evidence” standard “is simply inadequate to 
 
 169. Kutzko, supra note 160, at 804-05. 
 170. Id. at 809-10. 
 171. See supra Part I.A. 
 172. 362 U.S. 199 (1960). 
 173. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 (1979). 
 174. Thompson, 362 U.S. at 199. 
 175. 443 U.S. at 314-16.  To some degree, the Court’s analysis paralleled its method of 
analysis in so-called “constitutional fact” cases.  See generally Monaghan, supra note 4.  For this 
reason, Robert Gregory argues that the opinion’s logic compelled a less deferential standard than 
that which the Court actually adopted.  See Gregory, supra note 107, at 940. 
 176. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 313. 
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protect against misapplication of the constitutional standard of 
reasonable doubt.”177 
2.  Application of the Jackson Standard in Practice 
Many commentators writing in the immediate wake of Jackson 
supposed that the Court’s opinion enabled, if not required, reviewing 
courts to assess the weight of the evidence supporting a conviction.  
Indeed, an evaluation of the weight of the evidence seems necessary in 
any inquiry concerning whether the fact finder acted reasonably in 
returning a guilty verdict.178  For an appellate court to consider 
whether the evidence in a given case was sufficient to enable a 
reasonable jury to convict, the court must consider that evidence in 
light of the elements of the crime, and in the further light of the 
requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Given 
that the Jackson standard was meant to set a higher requirement 
than the “no evidence” standard of Thompson,179 this necessarily 
means that there is some quantum of evidence between none and the 
point at which the evidence of guilt is constitutionally sufficient.  
Assuming a case with some evidence, the reviewing court must 
somehow assess the quality of that evidence to determine whether it 
meets the Jackson standard.  It is difficult to imagine how it could do 
so without weighing the evidence. 
Perhaps the primary problem is that the logic of Jackson does 
not provide its own limits.180  Given the imprecision of both the 
“rational fact finder” and “reasonable doubt” concepts on which 
Jackson rests, the opinion could easily be interpreted as allowing for a 
virtually unbounded role for appellate courts in reviewing the 
evidence underlying convictions.  Viewed broadly, and with the 
understanding that the standard allows for the appellate court to 
 
 177. Id. at 319-20. 
 178. Gregory, supra note 107, at 913; Kutzko, supra note 160, at 807; Case Note, Standard of 
Review of Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Criminal Conviction, 93 HARV. L. REV. 210, 215 
n.50 (1979) [hereinafter Standard of Review]; id. at 215 n.53 (“[T]he standard may allow reversal 
if there is strong evidence with respect to credibility that a reviewing court can judge from the 
record.”). 
 179. See supra text accompanying notes 172-177 (discussing the Jackson holding). 
 180. Justice Stevens expressly noted,   
[T]he Court places all of its reliance on a dry, and in my view incorrect, syllogism: If 
Winship requires the fact finder to apply a reasonable-doubt standard, then logic 
requires a reviewing judge to apply a like standard.  But, taken to its ultimate 
conclusion, this “logic” would require the reviewing court to “ask itself whether it 
believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”     
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 334 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 
(1966) (internal quotation omitted)). 
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assess evidentiary weight, many, if not most, criminal appeals would 
present colorable sufficiency claims.  But the opinion can just as easily 
be read narrowly.  There need not be a great practical difference 
between review under Jackson and review under Thompson.  If, as 
Jackson mandates, reviewing courts are to view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the verdict,181 then the gap between no 
evidence and sufficient evidence could be quite small, indeed almost 
nonexistent.  Justice Stevens made just this point in his concurrence, 
noting that “in practice there may be little or no difference between” 
the Thompson “no evidence” standard and the standard adopted by 
the Court.182  Though some have suggested that Jackson compels that 
at least certain types of cases be evaluated differently than under 
Thompson, most commentators writing in the wake of the opinion 
agreed with Justice Stevens, concluding that even though the logic of 
Jackson suggested a role for appellate courts in weighing evidence, the 
decision would likely not lead to any more searching appellate review 
of convictions than under the Thompson standard.183  And that is 
precisely how the Jackson standard has worked out.  As applied by 
courts, the standard “is a highly deferential standard in the pantheon 
of appellate standards of review.”184  Most appellate courts have seized 
on the “any rational trier of fact” language in the Court’s opinion and 
have employed it in the deferential fashion decried by Judge 
Newman.185  Accordingly, opinions are littered with metaphors to the 
effect that the proponent of a sufficiency claim faces “a steep uphill 
battle”186 and “bears a heavy burden.”187  Although I am unaware of 
any empirical studies directly addressing the issue, there appears to 
be universal agreement that appellate courts almost never reverse 
convictions on sufficiency grounds,188 and the related empirical 
 
 181. 443 U.S. at 319. 
 182. Id. at 335. 
 183. See, e.g., Imwinkelreid, supra note 165, at 26-27 (discussing the impact of Jackson on 
drug identification evidence); Kutzko, supra 160, at 813; Standard of Review, supra note 178, at 
215 n.50. 
 184. 2 CHILDRESS  & DAVIS, supra note 1, at 9-2. 
 185. Id. at 9-7 to 9-10; Newman, supra note 17, at 988.  The Supreme Court also has 
suggested that this application is consistent with its Jackson.  “Sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
review involves assessment by the courts of whether the evidence adduced at trial could support 
any rational determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Powell, 469 
U.S. 57, 67 (1984). 
 186. United States v. Graham, 315 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 187. See, e.g., United States v. Almaraz, 306 F.3d 1031, 1040 (10th Cir. 2002); United States 
v. Richards, 302 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Gillespie, 974 F.2d 796, 805 (7th Cir. 
1992). 
 188. See Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 42, at 726-27; Newman, supra note 17, at 989-90 
(noting that appellate courts very rarely review convictions on sufficiency grounds).  Though 
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research reporting the low rates of success for defendants in criminal 
appeals is not inconsistent with this assumption.189  As a consequence, 
it is considerably easier for an obviously guilty defendant with, say, a 
strong Fourth Amendment claim to prevail on appeal than it is for a 
probably innocent defendant with no procedural claim.190  That is a 
curious state of affairs. 
3. Assessing the Alternative Justifications for Appellate Deference 
In the criminal context, three alternatives to the institutional 
competence justification might support the near-complete appellate 
deference to trial-level fact finding.  The first of these is simply that 
there is no practical need for searching appellate review because fact 
finders rarely make mistakes in criminal cases.  The second has to do 
with the appropriate allocation of scarce judicial resources, and the 
third with the courts’ authority and the virtues of finality.  There is 
some interrelation among these justifications, but for ease of 
exposition this section considers them in turn. 
 
Jackson itself concerned federal habeas review of a state court conviction, its standard applies 
directly to states and thus governs direct appellate review of convictions.  See 2 CHILDRESS & 
DAVIS, supra note 1, at 9-1 to 9-6; Imwinkelreid, supra note 165, at 25-26.  Many state courts 
have expressly adopted the Jackson rule.  See, e.g., People v. Hatch, 991 P.2d 164, 174 (Cal. 
2000); Coley v. State, 616 So. 2d 1017, 1018 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Clay, 290 S.E.2d 
84, 85 (Ga. 1982); People v. Spann, 773 N.E.2d 59, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); People v. Contes, 454 
N.E.2d 932, 933 (N.Y. 1983); State v. Urbin, 772 N.E.2d 1239, 1243 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); Staley 
v. State, 887 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).  Other states follow standards that, though 
not express adoptions of Jackson, are similarly formulated.  See, e.g., State v. Josephs, 803 A.2d 
1074, 1094-95 (N.J. 2002) (noting that the Reyes standard accords with Jackson); State v. Reyes, 
236 A.2d 385, 388 (N.J. 1967) (formulating the inquiry as “whether, viewing the State’s evidence 
in its entirety, be that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the State the benefit of all its 
favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn 
therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. 
Earnhardt, 296 S.E.2d 649, 652 n.1 (N.C. 1982) (concluding that the Jackson standard is 
substantially the same as the longstanding test used in North Carolina); Commonwealth v. Reid, 
626 A.2d 118, 122 (Pa. 1993) (articulating the standard as “whether the evidence, and all 
reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient to establish all the elements of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
 189. See, e.g., Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States 
Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 199, 218-21 (2001) (reporting extremely low rates of 
success for criminal appellants). 
190. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 61-62 (1997) (observing that “the courts consistently have 
adopted more favorable standards of review for non-guilt-related claims than for those claims 
most likely to be tied to guilt and innocence”). 
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a.  The Lack of a Need for Appellate Review of Facts 
One possible explanation for why courts and commentators 
consider searching appellate review unnecessary is that they hold an 
unstated assumption that juries and trial judges almost never err in 
their determinations of guilt and innocence.  If the process never or 
rarely results in the conviction of the innocent, then a theoretically 
satisfactory justification of current institutional arrangements may be 
largely unnecessary.  Put another way, if we do not need deeper 
appellate review in order to ensure that only the guilty are convicted, 
then there is little point to justifying the lack of such review. This 
justification, though rarely articulated,191 may explain the relative 
paucity of anything but the cursory justifications that appear in 
almost all discussions of deferential review. 
It is not difficult to see the attractiveness of such an 
assumption.  As discussed below,192 the jury system appears to be 
structured so as to provide us, as members of society, with easy 
grounds for believing that our individual conceptions of guilt and 
innocence, right and wrong, are being put into action daily by our 
proxies on juries.  Moreover, little of what takes place after the jury 
delivers its verdict is likely to shake us from this belief.  While it is no 
great or uncommon feat for an acquitted defendant to later be shown 
to be guilty by subsequently uncovered evidence, it is a much more 
difficult task to prove the negative that is innocence.  The wrongly 
convicted innocent defendant and the guilty defendant who is a good 
liar will tell the same story—some version of “I didn’t do it”—that is 
plausible, if perhaps seemingly unlikely, on the facts of the case.  
Circumstances thus make it easy for us to imagine that the system 
 
191. Although jury infallibility is rarely, if ever, expressly advanced as a reason for appellate 
deference, the view that there simply are not many wrongful convictions is occasionally 
expressed.  See, e.g., Ronald Earle & Carl B. Case, Jr., The Prosecutorial Mandate: See that 
Justice Is Done, 86 JUDICATURE 69, 73 (2002) (noting that, prior to the discovery of three 
wrongful convictions in Travis County, Texas, “[p]rosecutors had thought that the sun would 
come up in the West before an innocent person would have been convicted of a crime in their 
jurisdiction”); Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably 
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1328-36 (1997) (reviewing authorities suggesting 
that the problem of wrongful convictions is virtually nonexistent); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 
U.S. 298, 321 (1995) (observing that “habeas corpus petitions that advance a substantial claim of 
actual innocence are extremely rare”); LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL 
PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 4-5 (1977) (asserting that wrongful convictions are “very rare” 
and typically the result of “a nonsystemic fault peculiar to the case,” against which it would be 
difficult to guard). 
 192.  See infra text accompanying notes 233 - 239. 
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works as it should.193  In contrast, the idea that we might with some 
regularity be convicting innocent people is obviously distasteful, the 
sort of possibility that it is easier for our collective peace of mind not 
to entertain. 
Of course, to the extent this assumption has provided the basis 
for the lack of appellate involvement in jury fact findings, events of 
the past decade or so demonstrate that our confidence has been 
misplaced.  It has become increasingly apparent that our system has 
done a much worse job of sorting the guilty from the innocent than 
had been imagined.  News of wrongful convictions has almost become 
routine.194  Since 1990, more than 120 prisoners have been released 
upon a finding that they were wrongly convicted,195 and it seems 
reasonable to believe that these represent a mere fraction of the actual 
total.196  Not surprisingly, these revelations have unleashed a torrent 
of commentary proposing ways to address the problem.197  What is 
 
 193. In addition, the incentives facing prosecutors do not encourage them to admit that they 
may have been mistaken in their identification of the perpetrator of a crime.  See Earle & Case, 
supra note 191, at 73.  
Prosecutors have been understandably reluctant to re-examine cases once thought to be 
over and done with.  Cases in which the evidence proves the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt are difficult to put together, harder to hold together, and happily left 
behind once a conviction is obtained.  The ongoing onslaught of current cases and 
opposition from victims certain of the identity of the perpetrator add to the pressure to 
let sleeping dogs lie.  But perhaps the greatest hesitancy is the fear-based assumption 
that the public is intolerant of mistakes and unforgiving of those who admit to them. 
Id. 
 194. See Givelber, supra note 191, at 1319 n.7 (compiling media reports of prisoner releases 
for wrongful conviction). See generally SCHECK ET AL., supra note 101. 
 195. See Edmund Higgins, Database: Complete List of Cases (listing a total of 315 
revelations of wrongful convictions, 124 of which have occurred since 1990), at 
http://www.dredmundhiggins.com/listofcases.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2003). 
 196. See, e.g., Givelber, supra note 191, at 1321 (arguing “that America’s criminal justice 
system creates a significant risk that innocent people will be systematically convicted”); see also 
Keith A. Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study 
Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 336 (2002) (asserting that recent cases “have not 
only confirmed that wrongful convictions exist, and at a higher rate than ever acknowledged 
previously, but have shown that innocent people are often convicted in cases where innocence is 
least suspected”); Holly Schaffter, Note, Postconviction DNA Evidence: A 500 Pound Gorilla in 
State Courts, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 695, 737 (2002) (“Potentially hundreds and thousands of 
unexplored wrongful convictions in the United States remain undiscovered, uninvestigated, and 
unchallenged.”); Alan Barlow, The Wrong Man, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1999, at 68 (“Surely 
the number of innocent people discovered and freed from prison is only a small fraction of those 
still incarcerated.”). 
 197. A non-exhaustive list includes statutes allowing for post-conviction DNA testing, 
structuring police lineups and other identification processes so as to minimize the possibility of 
erroneous identifications, video or audio taping all police interrogations, careful screening of 
jailhouse informant testimony, structuring forensic investigations so as to minimize the effects of 
fraud or bias, reconsidering the scientific bases of forensic tests, enhancing oversight of 
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remarkable is that, for all the attention given the problem of wrongful 
convictions, and all the remedies proposed, the discussion has 
included no consideration of a greater role for courts considering direct 
appeals from convictions. 
In any case, the logic of Jackson suggests that whatever the 
standard of review the Court meant to adopt, it cannot be based, even 
implicitly, on an understanding that appellate scrutiny is not 
generally required because juries rarely make mistakes.  Thompson v. 
City of Louisville198 held that convictions based on no evidence cannot 
stand, and in so doing necessarily recognized that juries will 
sometimes convict even when there is a complete lack of an 
evidentiary basis for doing so.199  If that is true, then it must also be 
true that juries err in less dramatic ways, such as by convicting when 
there is some (but not enough) evidence to satisfy the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard, or when the evidence is qualitatively 
deficient.  And so long as convictions are normally distributed along a 
wrongful convictions to wrongful acquittals axis,200 juries will commit 
these latter sorts of errors more frequently than the former.  Jackson 
at least recognizes the existence of both of these sorts of errors, even 
though it takes no firm position as to the extent to which appellate 
courts may remedy them.201 
In the end, then, the supposition that wrongful convictions 
rarely occur, though psychologically appealing, provides neither a 
realistic nor analytically satisfactory justification for appellate 
deference. 
 
prosecutors, increasing the quality of resources available to defense lawyers, providing for 
compensation to the wrongfully convicted, placing a moratorium on the death penalty, and 
creating innocence commissions to investigate potential wrongful convictions. SCHECK ET AL., 
supra note 101, at 255-60.  For a more comprehensive discussion of some of the proposals, see, 
for example, Charles I. Lugos, Punishing the Factually Innocent: DNA, Habeas Corpus, and 
Justice, 12 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 233 (2002); Jake Sussman, Unlimited Innocence: 
Recognizing an “Actual Innocence” Exception to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 343 (2001); Wayne T. Westling, Something Is Rotten in the Interrogation 
Room: Let’s Try Video Oversight, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 537 (2001); David Defoore, Comment, 
Postconviction DNA Testing: A Cry for Justice from the Wrongfully Convicted, 33 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 49 (2002); Michael R. Headley, Note, Long on Substance, Short on Process: An Appeal for 
Process Long Overdue in Eyewitness Lineup Procedures, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 681 (2002); Diana L. 
Kanon, Note, Will the Truth Set Them Free? No, but the Lab Might: Statutory Responses to 
Advancements in DNA Technology, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 467 (2002). 
 198. 362 U.S. 199 (1960). 
 199. Indeed, Thompson itself is an example of such a situation.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 172-177. 
 200. This generalization makes the point that there are almost certainly more convictions 
wrongfully based on some evidence than based on no evidence.  The distribution need not be 
normal for the point to hold, though it seems intuitively likely that, at least on the wrongful 
convictions side, the distribution would resemble a bell curve. 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 156-157. 
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b.  Efficient Allocation of Judicial Resources 
A second justification for appellate deference to lower court 
findings of fact has to do with the economical use of judicial resources. 
Caseloads have rapidly increased over the past half-century in both 
state and federal courts.202  As a result, it has become increasingly 
important to allocate scarce judicial time wisely. Empowering 
appellate courts to review the factual underpinnings of criminal 
convictions, critics argue, would open the proverbial floodgates, 
resulting in even more work for already overburdened appellate 
courts.203 
If we accept the assumption that appellate courts are 
universally inferior to trial-level fact finders, the investment of scarce 
judicial resources in enhanced fact review hardly seems prudent.  In 
part, this is because our conception of appellate courts as dealing in 
matters of “law” includes an expectation that those courts will 
generate “law.”  In other words, the role of appellate courts involves as 
much the construction and maintenance of a sensible set of legal rules 
as it does the resolution of individual disputes.204  The adjudication of 
a claim that the evidence underlying any given criminal conviction 
was insufficient, in contrast, involves an inquiry that is necessarily 
dependent on the particular facts of that case.  As a result, it will 
almost never lead to a decision that establishes meaningful precedent 
for future cases. This, in turn, suggests that establishing a greater 
role for appellate courts in assessing the sufficiency of evidence will 
require those courts to spend a greater proportion of their time 
engaged in a task that is not their primary role in our system.205 
Perhaps more fundamentally, if appellate courts are always 
inferior to trial-level fact finders, assigning them a greater role in 
assessing the facts underlying criminal convictions will not result in 
more accurate fact finding, but instead may lead to less accurate fact 
finding across the range of cases.  In other words, if appellate courts 
were to substitute their own, inferior assessment of the facts for that 
of the trial judge or jury, the direct result would most likely be more 
 
 202. See MEADOR ET AL., supra note 148, at 329-64; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 53-86 (1996). 
 203. See THOMAS M. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS 350 n.4 (1978) (stating that 
caseload problems, among other issues, restrict most courts from lessening or removing the 
“presumption of correctness applied to findings below”). 
 204. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 453-54 (1963). 
 205. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 27, § 3.11, at 24; cf. Gladney v. Pendleton Corr. Facility, 302 
F.3d 773, 774-75 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that the factuality of  a civil rights claim is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion based in part on the case-specific nature of the determination). 
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erroneous acquittals.206  If appellate courts are less able than trial 
courts to ferret out cases where the defendant is not guilty, the set of 
convictions they overturn is likely to contain a greater number of 
appropriate than wrongful convictions.207  Such a regime could also 
indirectly result in more erroneous convictions at the trial level, as 
trial judges might be more inclined to convict based on questionable 
evidence in the belief that the appellate court would make the 
ultimate determination.208  In any case, it would be difficult to argue 
in favor of the deployment of judicial resources in such a manner as to 
reduce the aggregate accuracy of the criminal justice system absent 
some belief that other, less tangible benefits would result. 
Paul Bator made the argument in a slightly different way.209  
Building from the observation that we will never be able to 
reconstruct the actual truth about what happened in any given case, 
he asserted that the system ought not to be engaged in a never-ending 
quest to do so, or at least not be involved in an attempt to get 
increasingly closer to doing so via multiple levels of review.  Instead, 
“[t]he task of assuring legality is to define and create a set of 
arrangements and procedures which provide a reasoned and 
acceptable probability that justice will be done, that the facts will be 
‘true’ and the law applied ‘correct.’ ”210  So long as we are confident 
that one institution is generating results in accordance with this 
norm, he argued, there is no justification for having other institutions 
perform the same inquiry.211 
 
 206. Since appellate courts can review only criminal cases that have resulted in convictions, 
the direct effect of their errors could not produce additional erroneous convictions, but only 
erroneous acquittals (together with some appropriate acquittals). 
 207. This analysis of course makes the assumption—though presumably one we can be quite 
confident in—that the universe of convictions includes more appropriate than wrongful 
convictions. 
 208. Judge Newman posits that the opposite effect—erroneous acquittals at the trial level—
results from appellate courts taking a too limited role in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence.  
See Newman, supra note 17, at 1000 (suggesting that trial courts, knowing that convictions are 
not likely to be reversed on sufficiency grounds, “are reluctant to admit some evidence that is 
relevant to guilt but that also has some tendency to be prejudicial”). 
 209. Bator, supra note 204. 
 210. Id. at 448. 
 211. The presumption must be, it seems to me, that if a job can be well done once, it 
should not be done twice.  If one set of institutions is as capable of performing the task 
at hand as another, we should not ask both to do it.  The challenge really runs the 
other way: if a proceeding is held to determine the facts and law in a case, and the 
processes used in that proceeding are fitted to the task in a manner not inferior to 
those which would be used in a second proceeding, so that one cannot demonstrate 
that relitigation would not merely consist of repetition and second-guessing, why 
should not the first proceeding “count”?  Why should we duplicate effort? 
Id. at 451; see also Wright, supra note 2, at 781 (stating that the “very heart of the issue” 
concerns whether there is “any reason to suppose that the result an appellate court reaches on 
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Although Bator made these points in the course of an argument 
regarding federal habeas review of state court convictions—in which 
case presumably at least one state appellate court will have performed 
sufficiency review—they are likewise applicable to direct appellate 
review.  So long as we are confident that juries perform their task of 
weighing evidence in accordance with our acceptable norms of justice, 
the argument would run, there is no reason to have appellate courts 
replicate that task because there is no assurance that better results 
would follow. 
Significantly, all of these justifications depend to a large degree 
on the validity of the conclusion that trial-level fact finders are 
superior (or at least not inferior) fact-finding instruments.  The 
determination whether any particular deployment of judicial 
resources is sensible necessarily involves a cost-benefit analysis which 
takes into account the extent to which that deployment advances the 
goals of the system.  If trial-level fact finders always, or almost 
always, do a better job than appellate courts, then the benefits of 
greater appellate court involvement would be minimal, yet would bear 
potentially significant costs. 
If, however, one recognizes that appellate courts are in some 
respects better positioned to evaluate facts than trial-level fact 
finders, the judicial economy justification loses much of its force.  
Certainly juries and trial judges retain some of their long-assumed 
fact-finding advantages, and within that range of superiority, the need 
for conservation of judicial resources counsels against appellate 
reexamination of facts.  But to the extent that appellate courts can 
evaluate the facts in a manner that does not merely duplicate the 
work of trial courts and juries, the calculus changes.  If it turns out 
that there are accuracy gains to be had from increased appellate 
involvement, then we must assess the value of these gains, and weigh 
them against the likely costs of the additional layer of review. 
As outlined above, in the context of the criminal justice system 
any gains in factual accuracy should be highly valued.  We have 
always maintained that criminal convictions fall into a different, more 
serious category than civil sanctions, and we accordingly place a 
greater premium on the factual accuracy of guilty verdicts.  Moreover, 
recent revelations about the frequency of wrongful convictions 
strongly suggest that the system is not performing as well as had been 
 
the kinds of issues discussed is more likely to be ‘just’ than was the opposite result reached by 
the trial court”). 
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supposed in terms of sorting the guilty from the innocent.212  Gains 
remain to be achieved. 
In addition to the revelations about wrongful convictions, some 
have suggested that relatively recent structural changes to the system 
have resulted in a reduced focus on factual accuracy as contrasted 
with the historical norm.  Steve Sheppard suggests that historical 
changes in the phrasing of jury instructions concerning the reasonable 
doubt standard have led to a situation in which current versions of the 
instruction may reverse the presumption of innocence.213  In 
consequence, he argues, the government needs less evidence to obtain 
a conviction than it formerly needed.214 
More broadly, Bill Stuntz has argued that expansions in the 
procedural protections afforded criminal defendants have resulted in 
less consideration of the merits of any given criminal case by all the 
participants in the system.215  In doing so, Stuntz made three points 
that are relevant to the arguments under consideration here.  First, he 
suggests that rising crime rates have allowed prosecutors to be more 
selective in deciding which cases to prosecute, because there are more 
crimes than there are resources to proceed on all of them.216  He posits 
that as a result of this, prosecutors select cases that do not present 
defendants with strong procedurally based arguments, such as Fourth 
Amendment claims.  Because the absence of a strong procedural claim 
is a poor proxy for evidence of guilt—and most likely the correlation 
between the two is negative (because a strong search and seizure 
claim, for example, can only exist when an unlawful search turned up 
damaging evidence)—the result is that increased procedural 
protections for defendants have led prosecutors to pursue cases that 
are, on average, weaker on the merits.  Second, systems for 
representing indigent defendants are chronically under-funded.217 
They lack the resources to adequately investigate cases or to mount 
resource-intensive arguments on the facts.  The natural result is that 
 
 212. See supra note 194. 
 213. Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden 
of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1165, 1239 (2003) 
(arguing that the development of the standard toward a greater focus on reasonableness, and 
away from concepts like “moral certainty,” has resulted in a standard that encourages jurors to 
vote to convict unless the defense can convince them not merely to doubt the state’s case, but to 
do so in such a way that they entertain a doubt for which a reason can be given). 
 214. Id. at 1169, 1239. 
 215. Stuntz, supra note 190. 
 216. Id. at 23-27, 45-49. 
 217. Id. at 31-45.  For additional discussion of the problem of underfunding, see Adele 
Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery of Criminal Defense 
Services, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 293, 306 (2002); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded 
Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995). 
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counsel tend to substitute procedural arguments, which are 
inexpensive to make, for innocence arguments. Thus, the defense 
likewise places too little emphasis on what ought to be the core 
question in any criminal case, namely, whether the defendant is guilty 
of the crime with which he was charged.  Third, legislatures have 
responded to a perceived large number of defendants getting off on 
“technicalities” by increasing the scope of criminal liability, which 
makes proof of guilt easier and thereby turns what would otherwise be 
contestable cases into guilty pleas.218  When the range of behavior that 
can be classified as criminal is expanded, so is the possibility for 
wrongful convictions.  As elements of crimes are eliminated or watered 
down, the universe of evidence upon which juries can infer the 
presence of those elements expands.  Yet, if Stuntz is correct, this has 
taken place in a world where counsel for both sides are paying less 
attention to the merits of the cases they handle.  The result, he 
suggests, is “a criminal justice system that is less focused on the 
merits and hence more likely to convict innocents, a system that 
disproportionately targets the poor, and a system that convicts for 
‘crimes’ that cover vastly more than anyone would wish to punish.”219 
Taken together, all these factors—the existence of respects in 
which appellate courts can add value to the fact-finding process, the 
primacy of the criminal justice system’s stated concern with not 
convicting the innocent, the fact that it has become increasingly 
apparent that we do convict the innocent, and the suggestion that the 
system has evolved in ways that make the likelihood of erroneous 
convictions greater than in the past—suggest that the benefits arising 
from enhanced appellate review are substantial.  These benefits 
arguably outweigh even a significant burden on the judicial system.  If 
we value the avoidance of wrongful convictions as much as we purport 
to, there is a strong argument that we should support enhanced 
review no matter what the costs.  As Judge Richard Arnold put the 
point, albeit in a different context: “[t]he remedy . . . is to create 
enough judgeships to handle the volume, or, if that is not practical, for 
each judge to take enough time to do a competent job with each case.  
If this means that backlogs will grow, the price must still be paid.”220 
 
 218. Stuntz, supra note 190, at 55-59.  As Stuntz has argued elsewhere, the increasing depth 
and breadth of criminal law “utterly undo the accuracy-enhancing features of the law of criminal 
procedure.  The result is that we are probably sending a large number of people to prison based 
on conduct that is technically criminal (though the ability to stack charges puts even that 
conclusion in doubt) but functionally innocent.”  William J. Stuntz, Reply: Criminal Law’s 
Pathology, 101 MICH. L. REV. 828, 829 (2002). 
 219.  Stuntz, supra note 190, at 75. 
 220. Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000) (addressing workload-
related objections to a requirement that all judicial opinions be viewed as precedential).  
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There is, moreover, reason to be suspicious of claims regarding 
the magnitude of the resource effects that might arise from enhanced 
factual review.  As discussed below, appellate courts routinely engage 
in intensive review of sufficiency claims in the civil context.221 On the 
criminal side, appellate courts already spend a great deal of their time 
considering claims that require fact-intensive evaluation, most notably 
in the context of assessing whether an error at trial was harmless.222  
In considering asserted constitutional errors, the stated mission of an 
appellate court is to determine whether the error “was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”223 Determining whether an error was 
harmless necessarily requires the reviewing court to imagine how the 
trial would have gone—and what the result would have been—absent 
the error.  In practice, this standard has developed to the point where 
appellate courts are required to act, as one set of commentators has 
put it, as “a super jury”: 
[T]he burden has been shifted from requiring the prosecution to convince the appellate 
court beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not significantly affect the verdict, to 
requiring the defendant to convince the court that, but for the error, he would have been 
entitled to a directed acquittal.  That shift expands the review to the entire record and 
 
Addressing the point over sixty years ago, Professor Orfield opined that “the chief function of an 
appeal in a criminal case should be to see that justice is done to the appellant. . . . To lose sight of 
this purpose is to commit the ‘original sin of judicial procedure—the substitution of the actual 
ends of judicature for the ends of justice.’ ” ORFIELD, supra note 34, at 32-33 (quoting 2 JEREMY 
BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 169 (Richard Doane ed., 1843)). 
 221. See infra Part II.B.2.  Not only do the practices of American courts belie the purported 
justifications for extreme deference, but the practices in other countries provide further support 
for the conclusion that nothing inherent in the nature of appellate courts forces them to abstain 
from considering facts.  English courts, for example, are expressly empowered to take a broad 
view of cases, to the extent of being able to consider new evidence.  See DANIEL J. MEADOR, 
CRIMINAL APPEALS: ENGLISH PRACTICES AND AMERICAN REFORMS 7 (1973); see also ROBERT J. 
MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 7 (1990) (noting the same powers in the context of civil appeals).  As a consequence, 
English appellate courts focus more on the issue of guilt. See MEADOR, supra, at 7.  But see Lissa 
Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 1241, 1267-70 (2001) (observing that English courts are somewhat reluctant to exercise 
these powers).  For a discussion of practices in other countries, see Newman, supra note 17, at 
1000-02. 
 222. See infra text accompanying notes 223-224. 
 223. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  Review of non-constitutional errors in 
the federal system requires consideration of whether the error affected a “substantial right” of 
the defendant.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, 52(a); FED. R. EVID. 103.  Here, too, the analysis seems 
inevitably to involve the appellate court in weighing the evidence.  See, e.g., TRAYNOR, supra note 
27, at 28 (stating that appellate courts are “constantly weighing evidence to determine whether 
an error is harmless or rejudicial”).  For a review and analysis of the types of harmless error 
review, see generally Gregory Mitchell, Comment, Against “Overwhelming” Appellate Activism: 
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1335 (1994). 
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requires a new fact finding of guilt or innocence on the record without the error—but by 
the appellate court, not by a jury.224 
This review, notably, is not qualified to account for the institutional 
competencies of appellate courts.  There is, in other words, no barrier 
to an appellate court weighing any aspect of the evidence in the case, 
from factual inferences to witness credibility. 
Nor is there reason to believe that the absolute number of 
appeals would increase dramatically.  Those criminal defendants who 
are inclined to appeal their convictions will probably do so anyway.225  
Most defendants are indigent, and consequently are represented by 
appointed counsel.226  For them an appeal has no cost and, in most 
cases, no potential downside.  They are already filing appeals, even 
when they have no legitimate basis on which to do so.227  And even if 
many or most of these defendants included or substituted a sufficiency 
claim,228 the nature of the adversary process would operate to exclude 
many of those claims from the need for serious consideration.  
Appellate courts rely primarily on counsel to raise and develop 
issues.229  Realistically, no appellate court is going to consider a 
sufficiency argument in much depth unless appellant’s counsel 
submits a brief that makes a plausible case for the validity of such a 
claim.  So long as the appellate court’s reviewing authority is directed 
so as to focus the court’s scrutiny on factual matters that it is well 
suited to assess, the universe of cases in which such an argument 
could credibly be made will be circumscribed.  In this respect, a 
sufficiency argument would be like any other sort of claim raised on 
appeal.  That is, an appellant can always raise, for example, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  But he cannot always raise a 
credible claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Just as experienced 
appellate judges can easily discern that an ineffective assistance claim 
 
 224. 2 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 1, § 7.03. 
 225. “[I]n some jurisdictions, as many as 90% of the defendants who were convicted after 
trial and sentenced to prison will appeal their convictions.”  LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 18, § 
1.3(s). 
 226. See supra note 146. 
 227. What is more, these latter sort of appeals place an arguably greater burden on the 
appellate courts, requiring them to conduct “a full examination of all the proceedings” to 
determine whether they agree with counsel’s conclusion that “the case is wholly frivolous.” 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) 
(approving withdrawal procedure for appellate counsel that similarly requires appellate court to 
independently examine the trial record for potential appellate issues); WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2(c) (3d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2001) (describing procedures in greater 
detail). 
 228. Many of them would have raised a sufficiency claim anyway, since such claims are 
among the most common on appeal.  See ROBINSON, supra note 15, at 40. 
 229. See MARVELL, supra note 203, at 51, 120, 217-19. 
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has no merit if the appellant’s brief fails to provide a legitimate basis 
for the claim, so would they be able to do so with sufficiency claims 
under an appropriate standard. 
My point here has been simply to demonstrate that the 
judicial-economy argument for appellate deference is considerably less 
robust than previously recognized.  Any argument about efficient use 
of judicial resources necessarily involves a cost-benefit analysis.  To 
date, the analysis has largely assumed that appellate courts are not 
competent to evaluate facts, and consequently that the gains from 
enhanced appellate review of facts would be minimal while the costs 
would be substantial.  Having earlier argued that that assumption is 
false, my point in this subpart has been to call assumptions about the 
accompanying costs into question.  As I have shown, there is good 
reason to believe that those costs have been overstated. 
c.  Authority Concerns and the Virtues of Finality 
The third justification for appellate deference to lower court 
fact finding finds its roots in concerns over the perceived authority of 
the courts.  One component of this justification concerns the effect that 
empowering appellate courts to determine anew yet another set of 
issues would have on trial courts.  Were appellate courts to routinely 
exercise such authority, both trial court morale and, arguably, 
effectiveness would be compromised.230  While this may be correct as 
far as it goes, in this context it does not go very far.  For all that might 
be unclear about what the Supreme Court meant to accomplish in 
Jackson v. Virginia, there is no doubt that the standard the Court 
adopted in that case not only allowed some room for appellate courts 
to reevaluate the evidence, but as a matter of logic required that that 
reevaluation take place.231  Thus, even though appellate courts have 
perhaps not given full play to the Jackson standard,232 they still retain 
and exercise the ability to conclude that the trial-level fact finder 
improperly based a conviction on evidence that was too weak to 
support it.  Implementing a standard of review that allows appellate 
courts to take account of their institutional advantages would thus 
 
 230. See Bator, supra note 204, at 451 (“I could imagine nothing more subversive of a judge’s 
sense of responsibility, of the inner subjective conscientiousness which is so essential a part of 
the difficult and subtle art of judging well, than an indiscriminate acceptance of the notion that 
all the shots will always be called by someone else.”); see also Wright, supra note 2, at 779, 781 
(suggesting that broadened appellate review “impairs the confidence of litigants and the public” 
in the judicial system). 
 231. See supra text accompanying notes 178-179. 
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 178-179. 
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only involve a change of degree, rather than a wholesale change of 
approach. 
A second, and more significant, component of this justification 
relates to the public’s perception of the system.  Here, the argument is 
that society’s regard for the judicial system will diminish if appellate 
courts routinely exercise the authority to disregard the conclusions of 
the trial-level fact finder.  Although much of the language of the 
criminal justice system highlights the significance, to both society and 
the individual defendant, of correctly determining whether a given 
defendant in fact committed the crime with which he is charged, there 
is a sense in which society has an interest in, to use Bator’s phrase, 
finding “repose.”233  In other words, there is an interest in reaching the 
point where we can comfortably conclude that “we have tried hard 
enough and thus may take it that justice has been done.”234 
Indeed, Charles Nesson has speculated that, although it is 
rarely acknowledged, this production of “authoritative finality”—
rather than individualized determinations of guilt—may be the 
paramount goal of the system.235  As a society, it may be that what we 
are most interested in is not getting to the “truth” of the matter, but 
rather in resolving the matter.  Nesson draws an analogy to trial by 
ordeal, which “may have functioned effectively as a means of 
adjudication, not because it produced true results, but because the 
populace thought it did, and therefore respected its results.”236 
Under this view, deference to jury verdicts is critical to 
attaining the system’s goals.  The ambiguity of the reasonable doubt 
standard, coupled with both the secrecy of the jurors’ deliberations 
and the public’s perception that the jurors are as much its peers as the 
defendant’s, creates confidence that the system is accurately 
determining guilt and innocence. This perception that the system is 
accurate may be more important than whether the system is in fact 
accurate.  As Nesson put it: 
The strategy of the system is to seek the observers’ acceptance of the jury as surrogate 
decision maker, trusted because it is understood to be an impartial, responsible and 
representative body, operating in a fair and structured system and deciding according to 
an exceedingly strict standard of guilt.  The trial system presents the jurors with an 
array of facts, assertions, contradictions, and ambiguities, and then obtains a verdict 
 
 233. Bator, supra note 204, at 452. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of 
Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1194-95 (1979) [hereinafter Nesson, Reasonable Doubt]. See 
generally Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of 
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985) (arguing that the production of “acceptable verdicts” is a 
critical function of the judicial process). 
 236. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt, supra note 235, at 1194. 
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difficult to disagree with because the secrecy of the jurors’ deliberations and the general 
nature of the verdict make it hard to know precisely on what it was based.237 
If this is correct, then any post-conviction review of the factual 
basis for a guilty verdict is of questionable value for reasons 
independent of the reviewing court’s ability to make accurate factual 
determinations.  In its extreme form, the argument suggests that we 
must be concerned with maintaining the appearance of justice, rather 
than justice itself.238  Because frequent appellate meddling with 
factual determinations would suggest to the public that trial judges 
and juries are incapable of consistently delivering just resolutions, and 
thereby diminish the aura of justice, it should not be allowed.  Even in 
a more moderated form, inclusion of the need to provide authoritative 
resolution among the primary goals of the criminal justice system 
would place a greater burden on those seeking to justify enhanced 
appellate scrutiny of jury verdicts, at least to the extent that 
authoritative resolution as used in this sense necessarily involves 
deference to jury verdicts.239 
The assertion that the public’s regard for the criminal justice 
system would be eroded by increased appellate involvement in 
reviewing the factual bases of convictions is subject to two objections.  
The first is that it is probably not all that realistic to suppose that the 
public cares very much.  Though the popular imagination may be 
captured by the occasional high profile criminal case, in general it is 
fair to suppose that people’s attention is elsewhere.240  The public is 
simply not likely to know or care that much about whether appellate 
courts have the ability to examine the facts underlying convictions, 
and may believe that the ability already exists.  Moreover, to the 
extent that the public does hold the opinion that the criminal justice 
system does a good job of sorting the guilty from the innocent,241 it 
 
 237. Id. at 1195. 
 238. Cf. David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television, and 
Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 786 (1993) (“The 
appearance of justice, accurate or not, may be more important than justice itself.”). 
 239. There is at least some reason to believe that the opposite may be true.  That is, that the 
authoritative nature of the system’s outputs would be enhanced by enhanced appellate review.  
See infra text accompanying notes 240-244. 
 240. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New Legal Process: Games People Play and the 
Quest for Legitimate Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 993, 996 n.12 (1999) (“As much 
as judges, lawyers, and legal academics would like to think otherwise, the general public is 
generally quite indifferent to the business of the courts.”).  But see Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. 
Hoffman, Public Perception, Justice, and the “Search for Truth” in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1267, 1270-71 (1996) (noting the loss of public respect for the criminal justice system in the 
wake of the O.J. Simpson trial). 
 241. There is some reason to believe that the public does not hold such an opinion.  A Harris 
Poll asking whether “you think that innocent people are sometimes convicted of murder, or that 
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seems questionable at best to suppose that that opinion rests on 
something as nuanced as an appreciation for the jury mechanism.  In 
fact, it is common to see descriptions of juries being inclined to convict 
on the basis of their belief that the defendant would not be on trial 
unless he were guilty, which would support the conclusion that the 
source of the public’s faith in the criminal justice system lies not with 
juries, but with police, prosecutors, or elsewhere.242 
The second objection is that, to the extent that the public can 
be characterized as having a considered opinion on the legitimacy of 
the criminal justice system, it is by no means clear that the public’s 
regard would decrease if appellate courts were more involved in 
reviewing the factual bases of convictions.  Instead, public confidence 
might increase.  Indeed, Winship was premised on this conclusion 
about the basis for the public’s regard: 
[U]se of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and 
confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law.  It is critical that the 
moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people 
in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.  It is also important in our free 
society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his 
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper 
fact finder of his guilt with utmost certainty.243 
In other words, to the extent that appellate review of the 
factual bases of convictions results in more accurate fact finding, we 
might expect that—to the extent the public is paying attention at all—
it would likewise result in enhanced systemic legitimacy.244  It hardly 
seems implausible to suppose that an informed public might welcome 
appellate review that addresses the core question of whether a 
criminal defendant actually committed the crime for which he was 
convicted rather than on procedural matters of the sort typically 
regarded as “technicalities.” 
These may ultimately be unanswerable questions.  “The public” 
is not a monolith, and it may be meaningless to speak of a single 
 
this never happens?” resulted in a “sometimes” response from 95 percent, 94 percent, 94 percent, 
and 95 percent of all respondents in 2003, 2001, 2000, and 1999, respectively.  See Harris Poll 
(Dec. 10-16, 2003), http:/www.pollingreport.com/crime.htm.  
 242. Research suggests that much of the public’s “knowledge” of the criminal justice system 
comes from television, which, among other things, provides a distorted view of the effectiveness 
of police.  See Connie L. McNeely, Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System: Television Imagery 
and Public Knowledge in the United States, 3 J. CRIM. JUST. & POPULAR CULTURE 1, 1-2, 10 
(1995). 
 243. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 244. See Bradley & Hoffman, supra note 240, at 1294 (arguing that one way to enhance the 
public’s perception of the criminal justice system would be to turn the focus of appeals more 
toward substance, including “open[ing] the doors of the appellate courthouse to all colorable 
claims of actual innocence”). 
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source behind “its” regard for the criminal justice system.  Even so, it 
is possible that there is a significant sense in which the public’s faith 
in the criminal justice system is directly tied to the sanctity of trials as 
fact-finding mechanisms, and that it is a social belief in accurate fact 
finding (rather than accurate fact finding itself) that our system seeks 
to generate.  If that is the case, then most of the arguments on which 
this Article is based, and indeed much of criminal law and procedure, 
are superfluous or badly misdirected.  If, on the other hand, the 
articulated law is at least roughly equivalent to the rules and 
principles that actually govern in criminal cases, societal repose is 
only of tangential concern.245  In that case, fact-finding accuracy holds 
a primary place regardless of whether its accomplishment negatively 
affects the public’s perception of the system. 
B.  Insufficiency of the Evidence in Civil Appeals 
The Seventh Amendment provides that 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law.246 
This amendment, which reflects concerns at the very core of the Bill of 
Rights,247 seemingly creates an insuperable obstacle to appellate 
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict 
in a civil case.  Indeed, at one point the Supreme Court held that no 
error could arise from a district court’s refusal to allow for the 
transcription of witness testimony “to serve as a statement of facts in 
case of appeal”248 because the only potential use of such a transcript—
“to present the evidence here [to the Court] in order to establish the 
error of the verdict in matters of fact”249—was prohibited by the 
Seventh Amendment.250 
Times have changed, however.  The Court’s jurisprudence has 
shifted from holding that the Seventh Amendment bars appellate 
courts from ordering entry of a judgment for a defendant after the jury 
 
 245. As noted above, the Court has made it clear that the right to a jury trial is the 
defendant’s alone.  See supra text accompanying note 140. 
 246. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 247. See AMAR, supra note 138, at 81-118 (expounding on the centrality of trial by jury to the 
Bill of Rights). 
 248. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 443 (1830) (emphasis omitted). 
 249. Id. at 445. 
 250. Id. at 447-48.  For a historical discussion of the Court’s application of the Seventh 
Amendment, see Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 450-54 (1996) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
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had returned a verdict for the plaintiff,251 to dismissing that 
conclusion on grounds that “there is no greater restriction on the 
province of the jury when an appellate court enters judgment n.o.v. 
than when a trial court does.”252  Consistent with these developments, 
Akhil Amar recently commented that “the present-day jury is only a 
shadow of its former self.”253  More to the point of the present 
discussion, Stephen Landsman observed that “trends over the past 
thirty years suggest that reviewing judges have come to treat jury 
verdicts as fair game for the most exacting scrutiny.”254  Similarly, 
Debra Bassett opined that, “[i]n just the last few years . . . the United 
States Supreme Court, in a sharp break with more than 150 years of 
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, has transferred to federal 
appellate courts meaningful power to supplant jury verdicts.”255 
1.  The Formulation of the Standards 
Whether the trial below was before a jury or a judge, the 
standards governing appellate review suggest that appellate courts in 
civil cases are to accord near-total respect to the fact finder’s 
assessment of the evidence. A common formulation of the standard to 
be used in evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 
following a jury trial is “whether the state of the proof is such that 
reasonable and impartial minds could reach the conclusion the jury 
expressed in its verdict.”256  Under this standard, the jury’s “verdict 
 
 251. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 399 (1913). 
 252. Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322 (1967) (emphasis omitted).  For a 
discussion of the transition from Slocum to Neely and beyond, see Robert A. Ragazzo, The Power 
of a Federal Appellate Court to Direct Entry of Judgment as a Matter of Law: Reflections on 
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 107, 117-23 (2001). 
 253. AMAR, supra note 138, at 97. 
 254. Landsman, supra note 40, at 873. 
 255. Debra Lynn Bassett, “I Lost at Trial—In the Court of Appeals!”: The Expanding Power 
of the Federal Appellate Courts to Examine Facts, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1129, 1131 (2001).  This point 
of view is not unanimously held.  Less than twenty years ago Martin Louis suggested that 
“[c]rowded appellate dockets and the temporal inability of appellate courts to immerse 
themselves in the record of every case have necessitated deference to most trial level 
determinations having a substantial factual component.”  Louis, supra note 22, at 998.  These 
differences in opinion may simply reflect a focus on different strands of doctrine coupled with 
uneven or inconsistent evolution among the various areas considered.  One of the theses of this 
article is that the actual practice of appellate factual review does not comport with doctrine.  
Thus it may also be the case that Louis accurately describes doctrinal developments, at least 
insofar as they relate to the narrow issue of scope of review, but that that doctrine neither 
effectively restrains courts nor accurately depicts review as it actually occurs in a substantial 
portion of cases. 
 256. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falgoust, 386 F.2d 248, 253 (5th Cir. 1967); see also 1 
CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 111, § 3.01 (quoting Falgoust and noting that it exemplifies the 
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must stand unless appellant can show that there is no substantial 
evidence to support it, considering the evidence in the light most 
favorable to appellees, and clothing it with all reasonable inferences to 
be deduced therefrom.”257  In the framework the courts have created, 
this is technically a legal question rather than a factual one, and thus 
appellate review does not run afoul of the Seventh Amendment.258  
But any inquiry into whether a jury’s verdict was “reasonable” 
inevitably involves significant involvement with factual matters,259 
particularly among those courts that sanction appellate review of all 
the evidence in the case rather than review limited to that which 
favors the verdict.260  Moreover, as an analytical matter, the standard 
of proof should be incorporated into the reviewing court’s inquiry into 
reasonableness.261  Thus the question is neither “could a reasonable 
jury have been certain that this was the right result” nor even “could a 
reasonable jury have been confident that this was the right result,” 
but rather “could a reasonable jury have concluded by a 
preponderance of the evidence that this was the right result.” 
Linguistically, at least, a somewhat different standard governs 
when the trial was before a judge.  That situation is governed by the 
“clearly erroneous” standard, pursuant to which “[a] finding is ‘clearly 
erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”262  The Court has 
cautioned that the reviewing court is not to “duplicate the role of the 
 
approach of the federal courts).  These standards represent a gloss on Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 50. 
 257. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 386 F.2d at 253. 
 258. See Sward, supra note 27, at 6 n.17 (providing a brief yet comprehensive summary of 
the governing law). 
 259. See Landsman, supra note 40, at 896 (The standard involves “a far more expansive 
mandate than one simply focused on legal questions.  It allows courts to measure verdicts 
against their subjective ideal of a ‘reasonable jury,’ thereby diminishing respect for the actual 
jury.”); Murphy, supra note 130, at 767.  The analysis here parallels that in the criminal context, 
in which courts and commentators have also had to struggle with the implications of a 
“reasonable” jury for the form and content of appellate review.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 166-170. 
 260. See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 111, § 3.03; Landsman, supra note 40, at 897. 
 261. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (holding that “the inquiry 
involved in a ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict necessarily 
implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the 
merits”); 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 111, § 3.06 (“[T]he standard of review on appeal 
should implicitly or explicitly include consideration of the standard of proof that was used at 
trial.”). 
 262. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).  For a 
comprehensive treatment of the “clearly erroneous” standard, see generally Sward, supra note 
27. See also 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 111, §§ 2.02-2.12. 
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lower court.”263  “If the district court’s account of the evidence is 
plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of 
appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been 
sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence 
differently.”264  Even so, it is agreed that the standard allows, and very 
likely requires, the appellate court to engage in at least some 
reweighing of the evidence.265  
The accepted wisdom is that these standards are analytically 
distinct, and that the standard applicable to jury fact finding requires 
more (perhaps considerably more) deference than does that applicable 
to trial-court fact finding.266  Some, however, have questioned whether 
that analytical distinction really exists or, if it does, whether the 
difference between the two standards is “within the cognitive capacity 
of a reviewing court to discern.”267  And, as the next section reveals, 
the actual practice of reviewing courts provides support for the 
assertion that, whatever logical differences may exist, the practical 
distinctions are negligible. 
2.  Application of the Standards in Practice 
Despite the Seventh Amendment’s prohibition on 
reexamination of facts, and standards of review that appear to require 
considerable appellate deference, empirical evidence suggests that 
appellate courts are relatively willing to second-guess juries in civil 
cases.  Eric Schnapper examined all federal appellate decisions 
published from October 1984 through October 1985, a set that 
included 208 cases in which a “court resolved one or more challenges 
to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict.”268  Courts 
reached a holding that the evidence was insufficient in at least one of 
the senses alleged in 102 (49 percent) of these cases.269  Although, as 
Schnapper acknowledges, these numbers certainly overstate the 
extent to which appellate courts are willing to set aside the work of 
 
 263. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). 
 264. Id. 
 265. 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 111, § 2.05 (discussing the extent to which the “clearly 
erroneous” standard involves appellate courts in reweighing the evidence). 
 266. See, e.g., id. § 2.05; Sward, supra note 27, at 5-6. 
 267. Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 527 (7th 2002). 
 268. See Eric Schnapper, Judges Against Juries—Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury 
Verdicts, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 237, 246-47. 
 269. Id. at 247.  Broken down by the type of claim asserted, Schnapper found that claims for 
a new trial on the merits were successful 18.5 percent of the time. Id. at 248. Requests for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict were successful over 38 percent of the time, and 
challenges to the amount awarded by the jury were successful fully 50 percent of the time.  Id. 
   
498 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:2:437 
the jury,270 they nonetheless provide strong evidence that the 
traditional view—that appellate courts leave factual determinations to 
juries except in rare cases—is an inaccurate description of reality. 
Subsequent empirical research conducted by Kevin Clermont 
and Theodore Eisenberg has confirmed some of Schnapper’s findings.  
Utilizing a database that enabled them to consider all federal civil 
cases terminating in fiscal years from 1988 to 1997, a set consisting of 
21,415 judgments, they concluded that “contrary to the pronounced 
expertise, civil jury trials as a group are not so special on appeal.”271  
Instead, they found that “the jury and judge trials both experience an 
appeal rate of about 21% and a reversal rate also of about 21%.”272  
What is more, they found that defendants are more frequently 
successful on appeal than plaintiffs,273 and that this effect is even 
more pronounced in the context of cases tried before a jury.274  This 
pattern, which Clermont and Eisenberg attribute to appellate 
misperceptions about the treatment of plaintiffs in the trial courts,275 
is consistent with relatively frequent holdings that the evidence is 
insufficient to support a verdict, since such a claim will only arise on 
appeal if the plaintiff has won at the trial court.  It also suggests that 
fact finding by trial judges is not likely to be treated any more 
favorably than that by juries. 
Schnapper’s more impressionistic findings are likewise 
revealing.  Of the 208 cases involving sufficiency claims, only two even 
 
 270. One reason for this discrepancy is that sufficiency claims with no chance of success are 
unlikely to be pursued on appeal.  In addition, a sample consisting only of published opinions is 
likely to overstate the proportion of successful sufficiency claims because opinions rejecting such 
claims are considerably more likely to be unpublished.  See Deborah J. Merritt & James J. 
Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 
54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 76-79 (2001) (discussing various courts’ rules concerning the criteria for 
publishing opinions). 
 271. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: 
Defendants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 125, 127, 128, 131 (2001). 
 272. Id. at 130. 
 273. Id. at 135 (noting that, in total, “defendants reverse 28% of their losses but plaintiffs 
reverse only 15%.”).  In a subsequent publication, Clermont and Eisenberg report an even higher 
difference, concluding that “[d]efendants’ trial losses are reversed in about 33% of their appeals, 
whereas plaintiffs’ trial losses are reversed in about 12% of their appeals.”  Kevin M. Clermont & 
Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from 
Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 952. 
 274. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 271, at 138. 
 275. Id. at 142-45 (explaining that judges “imagine a biased and incompetent trial system 
handing vast sums over to undeserving plaintiffs”); Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 273, at 
949, 971 (noting that “appellate judges seem to act on their perceptions of the trial courts’ being 
pro-plaintiff”).  But see Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? 
Upperdogs and Underdogs in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235, 254 (1992) 
(rejecting a judicial-attitude-based explanation for the success of stronger litigants in favor of an 
explanation based on superior litigation resources). 
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mention the Seventh Amendment.276  Instead, “[t]he opinions read like 
the earnest efforts of judges attempting to decide what the facts really 
are, not like limited appellate review of a fact-finding process 
consigned to the jury.”277  Commenting on the notion that sufficiency 
review is supposed to incorporate notions of reasonableness, he 
observes that “[i]f the language of these opinions is to be taken 
seriously, a large number of sitting federal appellate judges believe 
that a substantial portion of the American public simply is not 
competent to resolve the often mundane factual issues presented to 
civil juries.”278  As for the “fiction” that consideration of the sufficiency 
of the evidence involves a question of law, he concludes that “appellate 
decisions regarding judgments n.o.v. bear absolutely no resemblance 
to an analysis of a question of law; these decisions are fact-bound 
analyses which focus exclusively on the evidence in the case and 
rarely if ever refer to any legal precedents in more than a perfunctory 
manner.”279  Although the emphatic nature of these observations may 
be unique to Schnapper, their substance is not.280  In the civil context, 
at least, appellate courts are not hesitant about involving themselves 
in factual analysis.  “[T]he reality is one of robust review and frequent 
reversal.”281 
3.   A Critical Assessment 
Constitutional considerations aside, the very nature of the civil 
justice system suggests that appellate courts ought to be 
comparatively less involved in reexamining trial-court fact finding in 
civil, as opposed to criminal, cases.  As Justice Harlan noted,282 by 
requiring civil plaintiffs to meet only a preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard, we have adopted the position that the avoidance of factual 
errors is relatively less important than the resolution of cases and the 
fulfillment of other systemic goals.283  As a policy matter, although 
 
 276. Schnapper, supra note 268, at 253. 
 277. Id. at 258. 
 278. Id. at 259. 
 279. Id. at 310. 
 280. See supra note 259. 
 281. Landsman, supra note 40, at 898; cf.  Lynne Liberato & Kent Rutter, Reasons for 
Reversal in the Texas Courts of Appeals, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 431, 440, 443 (2003)  (reporting that 
challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence constitute a relatively frequent ground for 
reversal in the Texas courts of appeals, while challenges to factual sufficiency account for four 
percent of reversals in civil cases). 
 282. See supra text accompanying notes 124-129. 
 283. To the extent there appears to be a significant number of cases of a given type in which 
plaintiffs prevail too often, a more appropriate fix would be to change the substantive law 
governing those cases.  Such a change often would not be for the courts to undertake. 
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accuracy remains an important object, it is comparatively less 
prominent than in the criminal context.  What is more, in civil cases 
we are not concerned with ensuring that the effects of any errors fall 
primarily, if not exclusively, on one side.  The detriment that can 
result from inappropriate appellate intervention in a civil case is of a 
magnitude that is at least as great as the corresponding benefits of 
appropriate intervention.  Even in a world where factually accurate 
verdicts were the only goal, this would counsel in favor of a more 
cautious approach to appellate factual review as contrasted with the 
criminal system. 
We do not live in such a world, of course.  The jury does not 
function merely as a fact-finding instrument, but instead serves other 
important ends.  Stephan Landsman recently identified four broad 
categories of benefits that the jury provides to the civil justice system.  
First, the jury contributes to the working of democracy.  It acts as a 
counterbalance to the undemocratic nature of the judiciary by helping 
to make the administration of justice a product of the people rather 
than of an elite.284  Second, the jury facilitates the functioning of the 
adversary process, which requires a “neutral and passive arbiter.”285  
Jurors are well positioned to fulfill this task by virtue of their lack of 
repeat participation in the system, which inclines them to treat each 
case as novel and therefore to give both sides’ arguments full 
consideration.  Third, the involvement of the jury helps to legitimize 
judicial activity.286  Because jury decisions presumably reflect the 
beliefs and attitudes of the community, rather than of an elite, the 
citizenry is encouraged to believe that the courts speak for them and 
reflect their views. Finally, Landsman identified a category of 
practical benefits furnished by juries.287  Juries, he argues, are 
generally good fact finders, ease the burden on trial judges, provide 
benchmark verdicts by which negotiation and settlement can be 
calibrated, and discipline the parties to simplify and shorten their 
 
 284. Landsman, supra note 40, at 880-83 (noting many ways in which juries are “democracy-
enhancing”).  One conceivably could attack the assumption that the judiciary is a less democratic 
institution than juries.  Cf Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-Majoritarian Difficuly: 
Judicial Decision-Making in a Polynomic World, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 781, 784-89 (2001) (arguing 
that, at the state and federal levels, the judiciary is not obviously less majoritarian than the 
legislature). 
 285. See Landsman, supra note 40, at 883-84 (finding that “the jury . . . is more likely to give 
each side the sort of careful and respectful hearing upon which the adversary system is 
premised”). 
 286. See id. at 884-85 (arguing that because jurors’ “decisions are manifestly based on the 
attitudes of the citizens of the community rather than the judicial elite,” they bring legitimacy to 
judicial activity). 
 287. See id. at 885-86 (finding that juries “render the system far more secure and effective 
than it might otherwise be”). 
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presentations.  Appellate scrutiny of facts would—Landsman would 
say “does”—substantially impede the achievement of these ends. 
Regardless of whether one is convinced by all of these 
arguments, at least some of them were among the foremost 
justifications for the Seventh Amendment.  As Akhil Amar has 
explained, “[j]uries, guaranteed in no fewer than three amendments, 
were at the heart of the Bill of Rights.”288  One of the primary jury 
functions animating the Bill of Rights was protection against 
government overreaching, since jurors, in contrast to judges, were 
ordinary citizens and not part of the government.289  Recent research 
revealing the overwhelming advantage enjoyed by governmental 
litigants in the federal appellate courts suggests that this concern has 
continuing validity.290  In addition, the Framers envisioned the jury as 
a tool through which the citizenry could be educated in self-
government through action.291  As well, the jury trial involved the 
people in the participation and administration of law.292  In Amar’s 
words, “[t]he jury summed up—indeed embodied—the ideals of 
populism, federalism, and civic virtue that were the essence of the 
original Bill of Rights.”293 
The resource-related analyses developed in the consideration of 
the criminal system are relevant here as well.  As noted in that 
context,294 any argument about judicial economy involves a cost-
benefit analysis.  Here, as we have seen, the primary benefit of 
appellate fact-finding superiority (greater factual accuracy) is valued 
less highly than in criminal cases.  At the same time, the additional 
resources necessary to provide such review might be higher.  Because 
most criminal defendants already file appeals,295 the possibility of 
more promising sufficiency claims would likely have little marginal 
effect on the rate of appeals.  The same does not hold in civil cases, in 
which the costs of appeal do fall on the parties and thus the rate of 
appeal will likely vary with the perceived chance of success.296  And 
while the analysis in the preceding section (which was based in part 
 
 288. AMAR, supra note 138, at 83. 
 289. Id. at 84-88. 
 290. See Songer & Sheehan, supra note 275, at 241-43 (discussing the disparities in 
appellate success rates between governmental and other types of litigants); see also ASHLYN K. 
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 291. AMAR, supra note 138, at 93-94. 
 292. Id. at 94-96. 
 293. Id. at 97. 
 294. See supra Part II.A.3.b. 
 295. See supra notes 225-226 and accompanying text. 
 296. See Bassett, supra note 255, at 1191. 
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on the observation that courts seem to have little trouble performing 
factual reexamination in civil cases) questioned whether the burdens 
associated with factual review are as great as commonly believed,297 
there likely remains some truth to the argument that such burdens 
exist. Here again then, circumstances in the civil system require more 
appellate caution than in the criminal system. 
C.   Taking Account of Systemic Differences 
One way to account for the disjunction between the 
implications of standard descriptions of the civil and criminal justice 
systems (which suggest that appellate factual scrutiny is more 
appropriate in criminal cases than in civil cases) and the world in 
which we live (in which appellate courts are much more willing to 
scrutinize facts in civil than in criminal cases) is to suppose that those 
descriptions are merely a façade.  Nesson’s speculation that the aim of 
the criminal justice system is to achieve “authoritative finality” rather 
than individualized determinations of guilt represents one such 
theory.298  It may simply be that we are not actually concerned with 
ensuring that this defendant committed this criminal act, but that it 
makes us collectively feel better about ourselves, or about the 
functioning of our criminal justice system, to tell ourselves that we 
are.  One might create a similar story about the civil justice system, in 
which there are reasons we seek to maintain the illusion of jury 
supremacy while in reality regularly overturning jury verdicts.  
Although the analysis thus far is consistent with such 
depictions, it is likewise consistent with a less dramatic 
interpretation.  It may simply be that the standards governing 
appellate review of factual matters are inappropriately or 
insufficiently developed to provide meaningful guidance to the process.  
Thus, the inconsistency between standards and practice may not be a 
product of the disingenuousness of the prevailing characterizations of 
the respective systems so much as of the failure of the standards to 
prevent courts from being swayed by concerns outside the proper 
realm of consideration.  Assume that Clermont and Eisenberg are 
correct in concluding that appellate judges tend to share the view that 
civil plaintiffs receive preferential treatment in the trial courts, and 
that they put this view into action by favoring defendants on appeal.299 
Judges need not be out to actively subvert the role of the jury in order 
 
 297. See supra text accompanying notes 221-224. 
 298. See supra text accompanying notes 235-239. 
 299. See supra text accompanying notes 271-275. 
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to generate results consistent with this conclusion.  A plausible 
alternative explanation is that the standards meant to connect larger, 
systemic aims to the adjudication of individual cases are not up to the 
task.  In any given case, then, it becomes easy to lose sight of more 
abstract considerations such as the role of the jury or the desirability 
of finality, or to suppose that they can be sacrificed to some degree in 
the name of what appears to be justice in the individual case, or to 
give in to the temptation to avoid confronting the possibility that this 
convicted felon may be innocent.  It is this latter explanation that the 
remainder of this article explores. 
The analysis in the preceding sections suggests that the courts 
have at least one thing right, namely that, in the context of factual 
reexamination, criminal and civil cases should be treated differently.  
There are fundamental differences in the type of justice the two 
systems seek to achieve, as well as in the manner in which they go 
about that process.  The problem is that the courts have their 
allocation of resources backwards.  Both analytically and practically, 
the criminal justice system presents an appropriate context for 
appellate courts to exercise the superior aspects of their fact-assessing 
ability in a relatively aggressive fashion.  By the same token, the civil 
system places a lesser premium on factual accuracy, while other 
systemic considerations like the simple need to resolve disputes are 
more to the fore, suggesting a more cautious approach. 
I do not mean to suggest that appellate review of facts is, in 
some abstract and categorical sense, desirable in the criminal context 
and undesirable in the civil context.  The point instead is that, 
although appellate courts are far better at fact assessment than 
previously acknowledged, there remain costs associated with appellate 
factual review, and those costs have to be balanced against any 
resulting accuracy gains in order to determine whether review is 
appropriate.  Our criminal justice system places an asymmetric 
premium on factual accuracy, such that avoidance of wrongful 
convictions is (at least in most accounts of the system) of paramount 
importance.  As such, the value that would flow from effective 
appellate scrutiny of facts is relatively high.  Our civil justice system, 
in contrast, places a comparatively low value on factual accuracy and 
a relatively high value on the role of the jury. That suggests not that 
appellate courts should never get involved in factual reconsideration, 
but rather that they ought to do so only in situations where they enjoy 
a clear competence advantage. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt a detailed and 
comprehensive recalibration of appellate factual review.  But the fact 
that the existing standards of review—which, as we have seen, at 
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least hint at what I suggest is appropriate—fail to bring about this 
allocation of resources suggests a need to reconsider the standards 
and, more generally, the relationship between trial and appellate 
courts.  The next Part briefly takes up this task.  It considers the 
nature and functions of standards of review, and suggests 
acknowledgement of the fact-assessing competencies of appellate 
courts, coupled with their inclusion as an express consideration in the 
review process. 
III.  SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FORMULATION AND USE OF 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
A.   The Functions and Purposes of Standards of Review 
Standards of review are, as their name indicates, standards.  
They function not to compel a particular disposition of a given case, 
but rather to fix the relationship between, and allocation of power 
among, the appellate and trial courts.300  A standard sets the 
reviewing court’s mindset as it approaches the issue, and operates “to 
guide the process, to tip the balance to one side, to direct the court to 
common points of departure already deemed relevant.”301  This is a 
somewhat amorphous function, and consequently some have 
questioned whether there is any point to attempting too much 
refinement.  As Judge Posner put it, “the cognitive limitations that 
judges share with other mortals may constitute an insuperable 
obstacle to making distinctions any finer than that of plenary versus 
deferential review.”302  Indeed, appellate courts often remark on the 
difficulties involved in attempting to divine the differences between 
similar, but purportedly distinct, standards of review.303  For example, 
while there may be conceptual differences between the processes of 
reviewing a trial judge’s findings of fact to determine whether they are 
 
 300. See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 111, § 1.01.  For thorough analyses of the 
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 302. School Dist. v. Z.S., 295 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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“clearly erroneous” and reviewing a jury’s verdict to determine 
whether it has a reasonable evidentiary basis, the practical differences 
between the two are elusive.304 
At the same time, courts routinely recognize that the same 
standard of review operates in different ways across the range of cases 
to which it applies.  The “abuse of discretion” standard, for example, 
applies to a broad range of both procedural and substantive decisions, 
the primary responsibility for which is delegated to trial courts for 
reasons that vary from decision to decision.305  Although all of these 
decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, the nature of appellate 
scrutiny varies depending on the “reason why that category or type of 
decision is committed to the trial court’s discretion in the first 
instance.”306 Thus, “[e]ven if the different formulations of deferential 
review (substantial evidence, clear error, abuse of discretion, etc.) 
amount to the same thing . . . the actual amount of deference given the 
finding of a lower court or an agency will often depend on the nature 
of the issue.”307 
Taken together, these observations suggest that, in general, 
efforts to refine appellate review are best directed not solely at trying 
to more precisely define the type or amount of scrutiny to which 
reviewing courts will subject issues in a broad sense. Instead, 
attention should also (and perhaps primarily) be directed toward 
identifying the sorts of determinations that appellate courts are suited 
to make and that thereby make appropriate candidates for more 
intensive examination.308  Phrased in the traditional terms, there 
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should be a greater linkage between standards of review and scope of 
review.  The important task is not to attempt to more finely calibrate 
appellate consideration of certain issues (a task that runs the risk of 
making conceptual but not practical sense), but rather to better define 
the contexts in which a court ought to exercise a firmer hand in its 
review—or, to put it another way, to devote significant cognitive 
resources to the issue.309 
B.   Express Consideration of Institutional Competence in Individual 
Cases 
We have seen that, in the context of reviewing sufficiency 
claims, the problem of appellate factual review is really two problems.  
In criminal cases there is (arguably) too little review, while in civil 
cases there is (arguably) too much.  And given that broad-level 
consideration of the two systems leads to the conclusion that greater 
appellate scrutiny should occur, if anywhere, in the criminal system, 
at least one of the “arguably”s in the preceding sentence should be 
replaced with “certainly.”  The task any revision to the governing 
standards must accomplish, then, is to constrain courts both from 
doing too much and doing too little.  Incorporation of the notion of 
institutional competence into review at the case-by-case level would 
achieve this end. 
Defining the appropriate parameters of appellate review 
involves a host of considerations.  Institutional competence is the most 
fundamental.  If there is not some sense in which an appellate court 
could do a better (or, at the very least, as good) job of evaluating a 
particular type of evidence or information, then the matter should 
remain exclusively for the trial-level fact finder.310  Even if the 
appellate court can, in effect, add value to the process, there remains 
the question whether it ought to attempt to do so.  This requires a 
consideration of the broader effects of appellate intervention, 
including its direct costs in terms of things like the consumption of 
judicial resources and the likelihood (and relative undesirability) of 
appellate error, as well as more indirect effects on systemic legitimacy, 
jury integrity, and the like. 
Yet, at present, institutional competence figures as an express 
factor in the inquiry only at a general level.  Because, for example, we 
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have assumed the superiority of the trial-level fact finder, we have 
deemed factual questions to be inappropriate for appellate 
reconsideration (even though courts tacitly recognize otherwise).  In 
similar fashion, because we have concluded that trial courts are in the 
best position to deal with a certain broad array of decisions, we have 
deemed them fit for reversal only upon an abuse of discretion (even 
though courts recognize—almost always tacitly—that all of these 
decisions are not created equally).  But the larger, more systemic 
considerations listed above311 also factor relatively prominently in the 
analysis here, making this the sort of inquiry that does not lend itself 
well to resolution on a case-by-case basis.  These are, instead, the sorts 
of considerations to be accounted for in making the basic 
determination of whether the court ought to engage in deference or 
some level of scrutiny, and are therefore best made at some level of 
generality.  By taking these factors into account we can reach 
conclusions about, for example, whether we want (and the Seventh 
Amendment permits) appellate courts to engage in factual 
reexamination at all in civil cases, whether they should do so in 
circumstances where they enjoy a clear competence advantage, or 
whether they ought to operate according to some other formula.  
At the level of the individual case, however, institutional 
competence remains largely outside the realm of express 
consideration.  In the context of factual review, the previously 
presumed lack of any appellate competence perhaps explains this 
exclusion.  In any event, once we recognize that appellate courts are 
competent in many respects to assess facts, and once we conclude that 
they ought to do so, the appropriateness of making express the 
analysis of competence in the individual case becomes clear.  That is, 
while it is possible to make categorical conclusions about appellate 
courts’ competence to review, say, circumstantial evidence, it is nearly 
impossible to say anything meaningful about the superiority of textual 
reasoning that can be applied across the board.  We can recognize that 
the ability to reason from text will often put the appellate court in a 
superior position, and we can perhaps even develop categories of 
situations in which this is generally true.  But the best way to put this 
insight to use is to structure the inquiry in such a way that a court 
confronted with a fact-based argument rooted in an assertion about its 
ability to reason from text must itself reason through that question.  
Ideally, in other words, the court would be required to work through 
the issue in the context of the case. 
 
 311.  See, e.g., supra Part II.A.3. 
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Assume, for example, a claim based on the assertion that the 
court’s access to a transcript places it in a better position to assess the 
inconsistencies between a witness’ testimony and her earlier 
statements to investigators.  As a preliminary matter, the court would 
of course have to determine that the appellant’s proposed resolution of 
the inconsistencies would be of consequence, an analysis that parallels 
consideration of whether an error was harmless.312  From there, 
review of such a claim would have to take into account such things as 
the likelihood that what appear to be inconsistencies when viewed in a 
transcript might not have been if witnessed firsthand, because the 
words of the trial testimony were sufficiently ambiguous that a 
significant portion of their meaning may have been conveyed 
nonverbally.  (Note that the reverse does not hold.  If the ambiguities 
are in the earlier statements rather than the in-court testimony, the 
jury would not be privy to any information that the appellate court 
lacked.)  A court considering such an argument would also have to 
account for the extent to which cross-examination brought any 
potential inconsistencies to light and, if not, whether the failure to 
conduct appropriate cross-examination amounted to a waiver of the 
argument. 
Or consider an argument contending that the jury 
inappropriately credited one witness’ testimony.  Here again, the court 
would first ask whether, assuming it enjoys an advantage, exercise of 
any such advantage could reveal anything of consequence to the 
outcome of the case.  From there, the analysis would have to account 
for the extent to which the witness’ words were ambiguous, such that 
the meaning of the testimony might lie in paralinguistic cues to which 
the court lacks access.313  Or perhaps the testimony concerned an 
eyewitness identification made under circumstances that the appellate 
court concludes rendered it unreliable.314  As these examples 
demonstrate, the point is not to license courts to engage in open-ended 
factual analysis in every case, but rather to recognize that factual 
reexamination is often appropriate.  Then, courts can bring the 
analysis out into the open, such that there actually is analysis 
conducted according to an articulated governing principle315 rather 
than factual evaluation unconstrained by any consideration of 
 
 312. See supra text accompanying notes 222-224. 
 313. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33. 
 314. See supra text accompanying notes 101-104. 
 315. It is the principle of institutional competence, rather than the examples of areas of 
appellate competency that I have identified, that should serve this purpose.  It would be 
impossible and incompatible with the functions of standards of review to identify in a vacuum all 
the areas in which appellate courts might enjoy these advantages. 
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whether the reviewing court is likely to draw better or worse 
conclusions. 
In this way, including a focus on institutional competence as an 
express component of factual review would resolve some of the 
dilemmas that exist in the standards of review as currently 
formulated and applied.  In general terms, it would serve to guide the 
fluidity that inheres in any standard of review.  Just as courts often 
recognize that the implementation of the abuse of discretion standard 
will vary depending on the nature of the decision under review, so 
should they recognize that review of the sufficiency of the evidence 
should vary along a similar dimension.  The key consideration 
governing both inquiries is whether the nature of a particular sort of 
evidence in a particular case is such that the appellate court could do 
a better job of evaluating it than could the responsible actor at the 
trial level.316 
In the criminal context, encouraging appellate courts to take 
their institutional competencies into account when considering claims 
of insufficient evidence would serve to provide a rational limit to the 
reach of Jackson.  Courts’ reluctance to implement any but the 
narrowest interpretation of Jackson is understandable.  As noted 
above,317 while Jackson may have been intended to change the 
traditional practice of extreme appellate deference, the absence of 
clear limits in both the standard the Court articulated and the logic 
underlying it left lower courts in the position of having to craft such 
limitations for themselves if they were to extend their role much 
beyond what had been the practice under Thompson.  Without the 
emergence of some sort of limiting principle there exists no practicable 
basis on which to prevent any expansive reading of Jackson from 
creeping toward the most expansive reading.  The choice courts have 
 
 316. To some extent, the analysis I propose parallels that offered by George Christie: 
If a determination depends on the direct observation of facts and the uncontradicted 
testimony of witnesses reporting their observation, the findings of the trial court 
should be upheld, unless they are clearly erroneous, regardless of what the fact in 
question is . . . .  If the factual determination involves reflection on the evidence and 
the record adequately presents the evidence, then there is a basis for asserting that 
some greater scope of review is warranted . . . .  Nevertheless, and again regardless of 
what the fact is, the finding of the trier of fact is entitled to some deference.  Thus, it 
might be appropriate for a reviewing court to reject the trier of fact’s evaluation of the 
evidence, even if the trier of fact’s conclusions are reasonable, so long as the reviewing 
court felt that its contrary evaluation was a more reasonable view of the evidence.  On 
the other hand, if the reviewing court cannot in good conscience maintain that its 
evaluation is a more reasonable evaluation than that of the trier of fact, a trial court’s 
determination that is reasonable in the light of the whole record should be sustained. 
Christie, supra note 3, at 56.  Christie takes a more restrictive view of the institutional 
competence of appellate courts to evaluate facts than do I. 
 317. See supra text accompanying notes 173-177. 
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faced, then, is between the previous practice of minimal factual review 
and the realistic possibility of meaningful factual review of nearly 
every case.  Given that it was undoubtedly easier and considerably 
more comfortable for courts to continue to operate under what 
amounted to the same standard as applied prior to Jackson, 
particularly in light of the uncertainty involved in the alternative, it is 
not surprising that that was the option they chose.  A focus on 
institutional competence would provide a sort of bounded liberation, 
pursuant to which courts could engage in some factual review free 
from concern that it would inexorably lead to full factual review. 
In civil cases, on the other hand, an express focus on 
institutional competence would have a constraining effect.  
Assuming—as many do not318—that some appellate reexamination of 
facts is appropriate, this focus would provide a rational limit to that 
exercise.  A court inclined to reconsider factual issues would have 
grounds for determining which ones it can consider, with the resulting 
benefit being the flipside of that identified in criminal cases. 
Note again that I am not suggesting that the two systems must 
operate under the same standard.  The systems place different values 
on factual accuracy, and thus deference to the other systemic goals 
counsels broader factual deference in civil cases.  Thus, our concern 
with avoiding wrongful convictions may counsel that we empower 
appellate courts in criminal cases to assess factual matters as to which 
they have any competency.  In civil cases, in contrast, we might choose 
to limit factual evaluation to situations in which the reviewing court 
enjoys clear superiority.  And there are, of course, strong arguments 
that appellate courts ought not to do any fact finding in civil cases, 
even if they are better equipped to do so.319  But even if one allows for 
review as intensive as that in which the courts apparently engage at 
present, express focus on institutional competence will serve the 
important function of restricting appellate courts to tasks that they 
are actually suited to perform, thereby providing appropriate respect 
to the jury and facilitating the furtherance of other systemic aims. 
C.  Institutional Competence and the Broader Aims of Jurisprudence 
The effect of requiring express focus on institutional 
competence would be salutary in a more broadly jurisprudential sense 
as well.  Another of the impressionistic findings from Schnapper’s 
study was that appellate decisions 
 
 318.  E.g., Bassett, supra note 255. 
 319.  See supra Part II.B.3. 
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provide no substance to any of these vague formulations [of standards of review].  None 
of the opinions applying the “reasonable jury” standard explain how much evidence a 
reasonable jury would require; the relevant opinions are every bit as uninformative 
regarding how much evidence is “substantial evidence.”  Equally significant, there is no 
perceptible correlation between the standard which a panel applies and the result which 
it reaches.  Indeed, a review of the appellate decisions strongly suggests that these 
formulations do not function as legal standards at all, but are merely rhetorical 
flourishes which open or close each opinion.320 
Less dramatically, judges have forthrightly acknowledged that there 
is a less tangible sense in which the court’s assessment of the facts is 
incorporated into its review of a case.  Karl Llewellyn wrote of “the 
court’s ‘smell’ for the ‘facts’ beneath the officially given ‘facts’ [being] 
frequently, not just semi-occasionally, a factor in the deciding.”321  
Thomas Marvell’s extensive study of appellate judges revealed that 
judges consistently take what Marvell termed the “fireside equities” of 
the case into account, often stretching the law as necessary to 
accommodate their sense of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.322 
Once the factual competencies of appellate courts are 
recognized, it follows that those capabilities should be accounted for in 
the law.  Llewellyn again: “Any frequently occurring phenomenon 
which is capable of isolation into a pattern or into an issue-focus 
repays bringing out into the open for conscious study, conscious and 
reckonable use, and possible conscious guidance or control . . . .”323  In 
other words, so long as it is clear that appellate judges can (and do) 
account for the facts, the system will function better, in terms of 
delivering better-reasoned, more consistent results, if we develop 
mechanisms for courts to do so openly, coupled with doctrine limiting 
the scope of those mechanisms to appropriate situations.  The core 
notion of ensuring that “like cases are decided alike” requires criteria 
by which to determine which cases are alike.  A standard of review 
that required appellate courts to openly grapple with the question of 
institutional competence in the context of assessing factual matters 
would provide such criteria. 
Indeed, precisely what Llewellyn advocated has long been a 
feature of the law’s development.  In the civil context, one can trace 
back at least to the 1930s complaints about appellate courts’ 
assumption of what had previously been regarded as “factual” 
 
 320. Schnapper, supra note 268, at 279. 
 321. LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 28 n.20. 
 322. See MARVELL, supra note 203, at 144. 
 323. LLEWELLYN, supra note 34, at 28-29 n.20. 
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questions.324  In a 1957 article on the subject, Charles Wright 
discussed four situations in which he determined that appellate courts 
had devised what he termed “new procedural devices by which their 
mastery of the litigation process can be made direct rather than 
devious.”325  Situations, in other words, where the appellate courts 
stopped accounting for their own assessments of the facts beneath the 
surface of their review, and began to do so in the open. These included: 
review by the appellate court of the size of verdicts; orders for a new trial where the 
verdict is thought to be contrary to the clear weight of the evidence; refusal to be bound 
by findings of fact of the trial judge based on documentary evidence; and expanded use 
of the extraordinary writs of mandamus and prohibition to control the trial court in its 
discretionary actions as to the procedure by which a case is to be handled.326 
The point is not that the specific developments that these 
commentators have identified are either sensible or not when viewed 
from a broad perspective,327 but rather that the transformation of 
factual issues into legal issues is a natural part of the evolution of a 
system of law.328  We now know that appellate courts enjoy certain 
advantages over trial judges and juries when it comes to the 
evaluation of facts, and we have a basic sense of the extent of those 
advantages.  All that remains is to put these ideas into practice. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
Contrary to long-held assumptions, appellate courts enjoy 
significant fact-assessing advantages over trial-level fact finders.  
These advantages are based both on the nature of the materials with 
which trial and appellate courts must work as well as on their 
differences in perspective. Incorporation of these superiorities in the 
process of appellate review would not only serve to correct the present 
imbalance in the appellate tendency to review facts in the civil system 
as opposed to the criminal system, but would also advance the larger 
goals of facilitating judicial candor and ensuring that like cases be 
treated alike. 
 
 
 324. See Wright, supra note 2, at 778 (placing Dean Green’s complaints about “the 
centralization of power in the appellate courts” at least twenty-five years prior to the 1957 
publication of Wright’s article). 
 325. Id. at 751. 
 326. Id. at 751-52. 
 327. Indeed, Wright was highly critical both of these specific developments and more 
generally toward the trend.  Id. at 780-81. 
 328. Cf. Paul D. Carrington, The Power of District Judges and the Responsibility of Courts of 
Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507, 527-29 (1969) (taking the position that the trends decried by Wright 
were instead a positive development). 
